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A

POLITICS-REINFORCING
QUESTION DOCTRINE

POLITICAL

Harlan Grant Cohen*
ABSTRACT

The modern political question doctrine has long been criticized for
shielding the political branchesfrom properjudicial scrutiny and allowing
the courts to abdicate their responsibilities. Critics of the doctrine thus
cheered when the Supreme Court, in Zivotofsky I, announceda narrowing
of the doctrine. Their joy though may have been short-lived. Almost
immediately, Zivotofsky II demonstrated the dark side ofjudicial review of
the separation of powers between Congress and the President: deciding
separations of powers cases may permanently cut one of the political
branches out of certain debates. Judicialscrutiny in a particularcase could
eliminatepoliticalscrutiny in many future ones.
A return to the old political question doctrine, with its obsequious
deference to political branch decisions, is not the answer. Instead, what is
needed is a politics-reinforcingpolitical question doctrine that can balance
the needfor robust review with the desire for robust debate. The uncertain
boundaries between the politicalbranches' overlappingpowers create space
for political debate. Their overlapping powers allow different groups to
access the political system and have a voice on policy. Deciding separation
of powers questions once-and-for-all can shut off those access points,
shutting down political debate. Whereas the pre-Zivotofsky political
question suggested abstention when the branches were in agreement and
scrutiny when they were opposed, a politics-reinforcingpolitical question
doctrine suggests the opposite, allowing live debates to continue while
scrutinizingpoliticalsettlements. In so doing, it bringspluralism andpolitics
back into the politicalquestion analysis, encouragingdemocracy ratherthan
deference.

* Gabriel M. Wilner/UGA Foundation Professor in International Law, University of Georgia
School of Law. Thank you to Kent Barnett, Pamela Bookman, Hannah Buxbaum, Nathan
Chapman, John Coyle, Bill Dodge, Kristen Eichensehr, Jean Galbraith, Hillel Levin, David
Moore, Julian Mortenson, Jide Nzelibe, Ryan Scoville, Paul Stephan, and participants in the ASIL
International Law in Domestic Courts Interest Group Annual Workshop for the helpful comments
and advice and to Gary Ashcroft, Victoria Barker, Leah Davis, and Shaniqua Singleton for their
excellent and invaluable research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION

In January 2015, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives John
Boehner invited Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to address the
U.S Congress on ongoing negotiations between the United States, Iran, and
other states over Iran's nuclear program.' It was assumed (an assumption
which proved true) that Prime Minister Netanyahu would use the opportunity
to explain his opposition to the deal then being negotiated by the Executive
Branch and to exhort members of Congress to oppose it. From the start, the
invitation was controversial. Issued without Executive Branch approval,
many critics thought it unwise, divisive, or perhaps even unconstitutional 2
an encroachment on the President's power to "receive Ambassadors and other
public Ministers." 3 Others praised the invitation, emphasizing Congress's
power and duty to keep itself informed on issues before it (in this case, a
potential nuclear deal with Iran).' It was generally assumed, however, that the
prudence and constitutionality of Speaker Boehner's invitation would be left
to democratic politics to resolve. Without clear constitutional doctrine and
with judicial review unlikely, it would be the electorate and the political
branches responding to it that would ultimately decide whether the invitation
was a constitutional effort to assert Congress's role or an unconstitutional
power grab.

1.
See Press Release, Speaker Boehner's Press Office, Speaker Boehner Invites Israeli
Prime Minister Netanyahu to Address Congress (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.speaker.gov/pressrelease/speaker-boehner-invites-israeli-prime-minister-netanyahu-address-congress.
2.
See Mike Lillis, Pelosi Slams Netanyahu Invite, HILL (Jan. 22, 2015, 11:19 AM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/230393-pelosi-slams-netanyahu-invite (noting that some
Democratic leaders viewed Speaker Boehner's invitation as detrimental to international
negotiations with Iran); Michael Ramsey, Is Netanyahu'sAddress to Congress Unconstitutional?
(UPDATED),
ORIGINALISM
BLOG
(Jan.
25,
2015,
6:50
AM),
http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2015/0 1/is-netanyahus-address-tocongress-unconstitutionalmichael-ramsey.html (answering the title's question in the affirmative);
Peter Spiro, Is Boehner's Netanyahu Invite Unconstitutional?,OPINIo JURIS (Jan. 22, 2015, 8:18
AM), http://opiniojuris.org/20 15/0 1/22/boehners-netanyahu-invite-unconstitutional/ (noting that
this event sets "precedent for congressional bypass of executive branch foreign policy").
3.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
4.
See Adam J. White, The Constitution Doesn'tLet PresidentClose Congress's Doors to
Israel,
WEEKLY
STANDARD
(Jan.
26,
2015,
3:26
PM),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/constitution-doesnt-let-president-close-congresss-doorsisrael 824707.html.
5.
Cf David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REv. 885, 889, 953-54
(2016) (suggesting that political arguments that certain constitutional arguments are made in "bad
faith" helps police the boundary between "off-the-wall" and "on-the-wall" arguments).
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Those assumptions about how the dispute would be resolved look less
certain after the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Zivotofsky v. Clinton
(Zivotofsky I)6 and Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II).7 Faced with the
President's decision to ignore Congress's requirement that "Israel" rather
than "Jerusalem" be marked as a birthplace for American citizens born there
and who so request, the lower courts initially abstained, holding the dispute
to be a political question.' The Supreme Court though disagreed, narrowing
the scope of the political question doctrine and holding that which branch has
the power to designate the place of birth in a U.S. citizen's passport is a
constitutional question subject to judicial review.9 Faced, in turn, with that
constitutional question in Zivotofsky II, the Court sided with the Executive
Branch, finding that the President's power over the recognition of foreign
states and questions of sovereignty was exclusive and unreviewable. 0 Not
only was the Executive's policy free from judicial scrutiny, it would be free
from congressional scrutiny as well.
Prior to Zivotofsky I and II, Speaker Boehner's invitation, like Congress's
Israel passport law, was in the constitutional gray area. After those decisions
though, the constitutional gray area has shrunk. The field is now dominated
by blacks and whites. Not only does Speaker Boehner's invitation look far
less constitutional under the Court's broad reading" of the President's power
"to receive ambassadors and other public ministers" in Zivotofsky II,12 it
suddenly looks ripe for judicial review under Zivotofsky I. In the next great
debate over U.S. foreign policy, will one more avenue for debate now be
foreclosed? Will unapproved speaking invitations, like passport policy, now
be off the policy table? For those observers cheering the tightened political
question doctrine in Zivotofsky I and its promise of subjecting government

6.
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky 1), 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).
7.
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
8.
See Zivotofsky I, 132 S. Ct. at 1426 (noting that the District Court dismissed the case on
the ground that it presented a nonjusticiable political question, and that the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed that decision).
9.
Id. at 1427-30.
10. Zivotofsky IH, 135 S. Ct. at 2084-94.
11. See Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 HARV. L.
REv. 112, 131 (2015) (explaining that the Court's arguments "potentially apply to situations far
beyond the recognition context, and the Court provided no principled limit on their broader
application").
12. Zivotofsky H1, 135 S. Ct. at 2085 ("It is a logical and proper inference, then, that a Clause
directing the President alone to receive ambassadors would be understood to acknowledge his
power to recognize other nations.").
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policies to greater scrutiny, such a result might seem an unintended and
unwelcome consequence.13
Of course, a dispute like the one over Speaker Boehner's invitation might
never reach a court. Many might even find it implausible that a court would
ever decide a dispute over an invitation to speak to Congress. And, in truth,
such a dispute would have to clear a number of hurdles to get to a judicial
decision, most notably, finding a plaintiff with standing and an interest in
actually bringing the case. But such hurdles can be leaped; the vagaries of
politics have a way of creating interests in litigation and novel theories of
standing that might have previously seemed far-fetched. Zivotofsky I and II
provide no reason not to decide the case if standing can be satisfied. Ifjudicial
resolution of the invitation dispute still seems unlikely or even out-of-bounds,
the question is why? And the invitation dispute is only one example of the
types of separation-of-powers disputes that might now be resolved pursuant
to Zivotofsky I and 11.14
This Article develops an alternative "pluralist" or "politics-reinforcing"
political question doctrine that can preserve space for substantive policy
debates without shielding the government from proper scrutiny. In so doing,
it vindicates the constitutional instinct that the disputes like the Netanyahu
invitation are ones no court should resolve.
A politics-reinforcing political question doctrine would be designed to
preserve the space in the political system for continued debate over policy
issues that the Court's most recent political question jurisprudence threatens
to eliminate. The current political question doctrine, its supporters, and its
critics all presume that disagreement between Congress and the President
should weigh in favor of judicial intervention. This Article contests this
presumption, highlighting the underappreciated costs of the current doctrine
for robust political debate. It develops a new political question doctrine
specifically designed for cases where Congress and the President have
overlapping, exclusive powers, and where we want to encourage political
debate rather than submerge it in doctrine and court resolution. There are deep
disagreements among the public regarding the United States' position
regarding Jerusalem, on war-powers, and on negotiations with Iran. Different
branches of government, accountable to different electorates, elected in
13. Cf Curtis Bradley, Symposium: Zivotofsky and Pragmatic Foreign Relations Law,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 9, 2015, 9:16 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposiumzivotofsky-and-pragmatic-foreign-relations-law/ ("This possibility has important implications for
those who call for more robust judicial review in the area of foreign affairs as a means of
addressing what they consider to be excessive executive authority.").
14. See infra Part II.B.2.

ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL

6

[Ariz. St. L.J.

different ways, and using different procedures, can give fuller, richer voice
to those disagreements than one branch acting alone. Deciding once and for
all which branch has certain powers can unnecessarily cut off debate. Echoing
Robert Cover, this Article argues that courts must use their powers of
jurispathy responsibly," exercising care not to submerge political debates
beneath clearer separation of powers doctrine.
This focus on preserving space for political debate connects a politicsreinforcing political question doctrine to other streams in constitutional
thought including politics-reinforcing judicial review, 6 federalism, 7 and
judicial minimalism" and picks up arguments in prior political question cases
that have so far been doctrinal orphans. It also distinguishes a politicsreinforcing political question doctrine from the way the political question
doctrine has often been applied. Unlike other versions of the political
question doctrine, a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine is meant
to protect or encourage debate rather than limit it. Complaints about the
political question doctrine after Baker v. Carrl9 usually center on the way
courts have used some of the Baker categories to insulate Executive or
government policies from review.2 0 Using arguments about the importance of
speaking with "one voice"21 or the need for finality, 22 courts put certain issues
beyond political debate. A politics-reinforcing political question doctrine is
different. It embraces cacophony, celebrates divergent voices, and
encourages pluralism. It counsels abstention or forbearance specifically when
the President and Congress are in disagreement, when exercising concurrent,
"exclusive" powers, the two branches reach opposite results. And a politicsreinforcing political question doctrine eyes political settlement-speaking
with one voice-more skeptically. A politics-reinforcing political question
15.

Robert M. Cover, Foreword:Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983).

16.

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 102-

03 (1980); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: PartisanLockups of the

DemocraticProcess, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 668 n.100 (1998).
17.

See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understandingthe ConstitutionalRevolution,

87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1059 (observing "[t]hat the separation of powers, including its vertical
dimension of federalism, may have the specific purpose of promoting a dialogue among different
voices even with regard to foreign policy issues").
18. See infra Part III.A.3. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-98 (2d ed. 1986); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 4 (1999).

19.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

20.

See infra notes 80, 94 and accompanying text.

21.
2001).
22.

See, e.g., Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1317-18 (1lth Cir.
See, e.g., Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340 (D.D.C. 1987).
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doctrine is least desirable when Congress and the President are in agreement
because in those cases, political debate has already ended or been cut off.
Nor is a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine about disabling
judicial power; unlike current versions of the doctrine, it is not a claim that
the judiciary cannot act, lacks power to act, or would be acting disrespectfully
to the other branches to intervene. It is, instead, about empowering the
judiciary to make prudential judgments about when to answer certain
questions and when to save them for another day.23 And a politics-reinforcing
political question doctrine is not meant to be an elaboration on one of the six
categories laid out on Baker24 or the two categories emphasized in Zivotofsky
26
1.25 It is a separate doctrine with a different justification.
Most of all, a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine provides the
coherent, balanced logic the doctrine has long lacked. Whereas proponents
of a broader political question doctrine have advocated more space for
politics and democracy, its opponents have focused on the courts' obligations
to say what the law is and the duty to vindicate individual rights against an
overreaching government. And debates, to date, over the political question
doctrine have largely been all-or-nothing propositions: those in the first
category urge abstention in wide swathes of foreign relations or national
security cases and argue for a broad political question doctrine; those in the
second argue for a narrow one or its elimination altogether. No distinction is
drawn based on the President's and Congress's relative positions towards
each other. Moreover, as will be explained more below, opponents of a broad
political question doctrine in foreign relations and national security cases
seem to have made certain assumptions about how the substantive separation
23. As will be explained infra, a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine thus bears
more in common with the power over certiorari or the doctrine of constitutional avoidance,
prudential tools of the judiciary, than justiciability doctrines drawn from the scope of Article III
of the Constitution.
24. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
25. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky 1), 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012);
see discussion infra Part II.B.1.
26. A politics-reinforcing political question doctrine might have implications for current
versions of the political question doctrine, but it is meant to complement, rather than replace them.
Thus, for example, the first two Baker factors endorsed in Zivotofsky I, textual commitment of a
question to another branch and a lack ofjudicially manageable standards, would remain additional
reasons for abstention alongside a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine. As will become
obvious infra, a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine might suggest reading the other
Baker categories much more narrowly (if using them at all), but one need not take that position.
One could embrace both a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine and a broader
understanding of the Baker factors; these would just present countervailing reasons either for or
against abstention that would have to be weighed against one another in a given case.
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of powers issues would be resolved in the doctrine's absence. Those
opponents cheered the tightening of the political question doctrine in
Zivotofsky I as a promise that government policies would henceforth be
subjected to greater judicial scrutiny. Zivotofsky II's endorsement of broad,
unreviewable Executive control of questions related to the recognition of
foreign states and governments suggests that assumption was unwise. 27 A
politics-reinforcing political question doctrine provides a more calibrated
approach, one more carefully attuned to how decisions to abstain or defer in
particular cases will encourage fewer or more checks on government
authority. It provides a clear path between the two traditional poles of the
debate, explaining when a court should favor politics and when it should
intercede.
Part II describes the history of the modern political question doctrine from
Baker through Zivotofsky II. Part II.A describes Baker's reformulation of the
political question doctrine as a function of six factors, the application of those
factors by courts over the following decades, and the criticism that modern
doctrine engendered. It explores how the Baker factors came to be molded
into a shield, sheltering the government from scrutiny. Part II.B describes the
Court's reaction to those trends in Zivotofsky I, and how the narrower version
of the doctrine described there led to the substantive result in Zivotofsky II.
This Part then explores the implications of Zivotofsky II, suggesting
unresolved areas of constitutional law that may now be resolved and the
impact resolution might have on the room for political debate over
substantive questions of foreign and defense policy and for "negotiated"
solutions to separation of powers question like the War Powers Act or
Executive Agreements.
Part III teases out an alternative route. Part III.A explores structural,
theoretical, and historical arguments for protecting Congress's and the
President's ability to disagree. It also follows hints of more pluralistic,
democracy-enforcing arguments for judicial forbearance strewn through
decisions on standing or the political question doctrine that have so far been
obscured by the Baker factors. Part III.B brings these ideas together to forge
a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine, describing when and how it
operates, as well as how it relates to current forms of the political question
and standing doctrines. Despite picking up on themes across constitutional
law, a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine is a radical departure
from the applications urged by current doctrine, its supporters, and its critics,
27. Cf Jean Galbraith, Zivotofsky v. Kerry and the Balance ofPower, 109 AJIL UNBOUND
16, 17-18 (2015) (suggesting that, in hindsight, it might have been best if the Court had decided
the case in a way that would have had less precedential effect).
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all of whom assume that abstention will be less warranted when Congress
and the President are actually and actively opposed. This Section explains
where that existing assumption came from as well as why that assumption is
only half-right. It explains how application of a politics-reinforcing political
question doctrine would respond to the concerns behind that assumption
while also protecting the space for democracy and debate from unduly
restrictive interpretations of congressional and/or presidential power.
Part IV applies the politics-reinforcing political question described here to
a series of different cases to explore how it might work in practice. In
particular, this Part focuses on the three prototype cases, Youngstown,2 8
Zivotofsky,2 9 and Boumediene,3 0 to explain how a politics-reinforcing political
question doctrine might or might not change how those cases would have
been decided. First, designed to encourage fulsome debate, a politicsreinforcing political question doctrine would not ignore congressional or
presidential aggrandizement. If, on first analysis, one of the two political
branches cannot make a reasonable argument that it has the power it is
claiming, courts should not hesitate to strike down that branch's action.
Second, designed to reinforce political channels for debate, a politicsreinforcing political question doctrine will be most applicable where that
debate remains robust and least applicable where it seems to have run out or
broken down. And third, a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine
must take individual rights seriously. The importance of individual rights
claims must be weighed against structural concerns about leaving room for
future debate. Where individual rights must be vindicated, a court cannot
abstain entirely. A politics-reinforcing political question doctrine though
suggests that such a court should try to minimize the effect of its decision on
the broader political process, avoiding wherever possible, broad, final
decisions on the allocation of powers between the political branches.
A new political question doctrine may be too much for some to embrace.
My hope though is the tests laid out in Part IV can still serve as a set of softer
pluralist justiciability principles-a politics-respecting checklist that courts
can use to decide when and how to approach separation of powers disputes.
The goal of both a more fulsome doctrine laid out in this Article and such
politics-reinforcing justiciability principles is the same: to guarantee that
courts properly consider the effects their decisions might have on the space
for robust political debates in the future.
Part V concludes.
28.
29.
30.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Zivotofsky I, 132 S. Ct. 1421.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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THE MODERN POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE: PROTECTING
POLITICAL DECISIONS

A.

1.

From Marbury to Zivotofsky

Doctrinal Origins

The first suggestion that U.S. courts should refrain from deciding certain
"political questions" ironically appears in the same Chief Justice Marshall
opinion that announced judicial review and that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 3 ' As the
Chief Justice wrote in Marbury v. Madison, "the President is invested with
certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his
own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political
character, and to his own conscience." 3 2 Unlike those questions subject to
judicial review, those "subjects are political," and "whatever opinion may be
entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still
there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion."33 "[T]he
decision of the executive is conclusive." 34
Over time, the courts expanded on this notion, describing a range of
questions that were essentially "political" rather than "judicial" and should
thus be left to Congress, the President, or both. Some of these were related to
foreign policy, including recognition of foreign sovereigns and sovereign
control of territory,3 5 the continued effect of treaties, 3 6 or whether or not the
United States was or remained at war.37 Others went to the powers of
government actors, including decisions whether states had violated the
Constitution's guarantee of a republican form of government,3 8 the proper

31. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
32. Id. at 165-66.
33. Id. at 166.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415, 418 (1839).
36. See, e.g., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 514 (1947) ("[T]he question whether a state is
in a position to perform its treaty obligations is essentially a political question.").
37. See, e.g., Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 168-69 (1948) ("'The state of war' may
be terminated by treaty or legislation or Presidential proclamation. Whatever the modes, its
termination is a political act.").
38. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 568-69 (1916); Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 18 (1849).
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apportionment of congressional districts,3 9 proper modes for amending the
U.S. Constitution, 40 and impeachment. 4 1 In some cases, as with many of the
foreign policy questions above, the courts simply treated the government's
decision as an unreviewable fact. In others, as with those that challenged the
powers of particular branches of government, the courts abstained from
hearing the case altogether.4 2

2.

Baker v. Carr

The Court sought to bring some coherence to this somewhat random set
of political questions and define more clearly when the courts should or
43
should not invoke it in Baker v. Carr.
In the process of explaining why the
drawing of state legislative districts could be justiciable, Justice Brennan
described six factors that might make a case a political question immune from
judicial review. Those six factors included: (1) "textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;"
(2) "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it;" (3) "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;" (4) "the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government;" (5) "an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made," sometimes
described as the need for "finality;" and (6) "the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question," or the need of the United States to speak with one voice. 4 4

39. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004).
40. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939).
41. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1993).
42. Tara Leigh Grove has argued that the former represented the "traditional political
question doctrine" and was only fully displaced by the latter, "modem political question doctrine"
requiring abstention in Baker. Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question
Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1908, 1911-14 (2015). Jack Goldsmith made a similar argument.
Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1395, 1401 (1999) ("This categorical approach to political questions in the foreign relations
context changed after Baker v. Carr.").
43. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
44. Id. at 217, 222.
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Foreign Relations as Political Question

At the Supreme Court

After Baker, the courts applied the factors to a wide range of cases, but
over time, fewer and fewer questions seemed to fall into the "political"
category beyond judicial scrutiny. 45 Foreign affairs and national security
remained the major exception. Despite Justice Brennan's counsel that "it is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance, "46 application of the political
question doctrine to foreign relations and national security cases has
remained common. As Thomas Franck explained in 1992, "the politicalquestion doctrine's domestic use has been virtually eradicated in recent years
even as its applicability to foreign affairs has been reinforced by the courts."4 7
"The doctrine, which once applied to many areas of governance, now applies
almost exclusively to foreign-affairs and national-security cases." 48 More
than twenty years later, that picture has not really changed.
Between Baker and Zivotofsky I, the Supreme Court said relatively little
on the application of the political question doctrine to foreign affairs and
national security, and what it did say was hardly crystal clear. In Goldwater
v. Carter, Justice Rehnquist, writing for four justices, argued that the case
should be dismissed because the question of whether the President could
terminate a treaty without the support of Congress was "'political' and
therefore nonjusticiable." 49 As he explained, "it involves the authority of the
President in the conduct of our country's foreign relations and the extent to
which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the
President.""o Without directly referencing Baker factors,5 ' Justice Rehnquist
argued that the Constitution was silent on the procedures for terminating a
treaty and that thus "the instant case[,] in [his] view[,] also 'must surely be

45. The cases to which the doctrine was applied increasingly looked like special exceptions.
See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 272 (2004) (gerrymandering); Nixon v. United States,
506 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1993) (impeachment).
46. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
47.

THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS 19 (1992).

48. Id. at 20.
49. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
50. Id.
51. See Lisa Rudikoff Price, Banishing the Specter of Judicial Foreign Policymaking: A
Competence-Based Approach to the Political Question Doctrine, 38 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL.
323, 336 (2005) ("For example, the Supreme Court did not follow Baker's case-by-case approach
in Goldwater v. Carter.").
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'

controlled by political standards. "'52 Further, he argued, "the justifications for
concluding that the question here is political in nature are even more
compelling . . . because it involves foreign relations-specifically a treaty
commitment to use military force in the defense of a foreign government if
attacked."5 3 To the extent Justice Rehnquist was applying the Baker factors,
he seemed to be scrunching all six into a ball, finding that the issue was left
to the other branches of government in part because there was no clear
constitutional answer and in part because foreign relations and national
security raised particular concerns about policy space, embarrassment,
finality, and speaking with one voice.
Justice Powell also voted to dismiss, but because without clear
congressional opposition to the President on terminating the treaty, the
dispute was not yet ripe for judicial review.5 4 He thoroughly disagreed with
Justice Rehnquist that the case was a political question." Applying the Baker
factors, he found none applicable. Presaging the majority opinion in
Zivotofsky I,56 Justice Powell argued that the treaty termination question
before the Court was not a "political" one textually committed to another
branch of government, but a judicial one, namely, to which branch or
branches the Constitution granted that power. 7 Nor were there no judicially
manageable standards to decide the case." The constitutional question was a
difficult one, but no more difficult than many other questions the Court was
required to answer. The Court would not be imposing its policy judgment
regarding the treaty with Taiwan at issue but simply determining which
branches were allowed to make that policy judgment.59 And concerns about
respect, finality, and the need for the country to speak with one voice all
seemed overblown, particularly if the case were ripe for review and Congress
and the President were in actual disagreement over the Mutual Defense
Treaty with Taiwan. Justice Brennan, who dissented and would have decided
the dispute, agreed with Justice Powell on the political question doctrine.60
"Mr. Justice Rehnquist, in my view, profoundly misapprehends the politicalquestion principle as it applies to matters of foreign relations," he wrote.6
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1003.
Id. at 1003-04.
Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring).
See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998-99 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 999 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 1000-01 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 1006-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The Court returned to the question of the political question doctrine and
foreign affairs seven years later, and in Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Society, 62 recognized some limits on the doctrine's application to
foreign relations cases. Faced with a challenge to the Secretary of
Commerce's decision not to certify Japan for failing to comply with
International Whaling Commission quotas, the Court observed that "the
courts have the authority to construe treaties and executive agreements, and
it goes without saying that interpreting congressional legislation is a recurring
and accepted task for the federal courts." 63 Finding the question in this case
to be "a purely legal question of statutory interpretation," the Court found no
reason to abstain.64
And during the fifty years between Baker and Zivotofsky, the Supreme
Court certainly considered and reached the merits of its fair share of foreign
affairs and national security cases. Questions regarding treaty interpretation,6
detainee rights,66 and military commissions, 7 whether explicitly or implicitly,
were found to raise judicial rather than political questions that the Court could
and did decide.
b.

In the Lower Courts

The real action on the political question doctrine was happening in the
lower courts, where the courts were applying the six Baker factors to abstain
from a wide array of foreign relations cases. Perhaps influenced by the
breadth of Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Goldwater, the lower courts read
the first Baker factor very broadly, finding the overall conduct of foreign
policy textually committed by the Constitution to the political branches. They
combined this finding with a heavy reliance on the more "prudential" Baker
factors-the need for a policy judgment, 8 concerns of embarrassing the other

62. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1986).
63. Id. at 230.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1206 (2014); Lozano v.
Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1235 (2014); Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013); Abbott
v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 5 (2010); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 497-99 (2008).
66. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2008); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
472-73 (2004).
67. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006).
68. See Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1317 (1lth Cir. 2001)
(finding that the court "would be unavoidably thrust into making policy judgments of the sort

unsuited for the judicial branch").
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branches, 6 9 concerns about finality, 70 and the importance of the United States
speaking with one voice7 '-to simply avoid complicated foreign relations and
national security cases. And the lower courts did so both before and after
Japan Whaling. 72 The Supreme Court, for its part, ignored this trend more
than it encouraged it.
Thus, for example, in Schneider v. Kissinger,73 the D.C. Circuit affirmed
dismissal of a claim brought against Henry Kissinger and the United States
for their involvement in a coup in Chile and the resultant death of Chilean
General Ren6 Schneider. 74 For the D.C. Circuit, "the lawsuit raise[d] policy
questions that are textually committed to a coordinate branch of
government." 75 As the court explained, "'[t]he conduct of the foreign
relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the
Executive and Legislative-'the political'-Departments of the Government,
and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power
is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. '"76 Beyond that though, the court
"conclude[d] that at least the first four of the six Baker factors compel a
determination that this case raises political questions committed to the
political branches and therefore is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts."
Similarly, in Corriev. Caterpillar,the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of
a claim against Caterpillar for selling bulldozers to the Israeli Defense Forces
that they should have known would be used to demolish Palestinian homes
69. See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[W]e are mindful of
the potential for causing international embarrassment were a federal court to undermine foreign
policy decisions in the sensitive context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."); Lowry v. Reagan,
676 F. Supp. 333, 340 (D.D.C. 1987) ("[T]he Court would risk the potentiality of embarrassment
[that would result] from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.")
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
70. See Corrie, 503 F.3d at 983 (observing that the challenged decision was "not only a
decision committed to the political branches, but a decision those branches have already made").
71. See Made in the USA Found., 242 F.3d at 1318 ("A judicial declaration invalidating
NAFTA at this stage would clearly risk 'the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question."') (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217);
Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 340 ("[T]his Court concludes that the volatile situation in the Persian Gulf
demands, in the words of Baker v. Carr,a 'single-voiced statement of the Government's views.')
(quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211).
72. Although the Circuit Courts cite Japan Whaling following the Supreme Court's decision
in that case, that decision seems to have done very little to restrict Circuit Court use of the political
question doctrine.
73. Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
74. Id. at 191-92.
75. Id. at 194.
76. Id. (quoting Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)).
77. Id at 198.
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and which ended up causing the death of the plaintiffs' relatives." Observing
that 'cases interpreting the broad textual grants of authority to the President
and Congress in the areas of foreign affairs leave only a narrowly
circumscribed role for the Judiciary,"' 79 the court found that the claim raised
a political question because Caterpillar's sales were part of an aid program
authorized by Congress and the President.so Beyond raising questions
textually committed to the political branches, "Plaintiffs' action also runs
head-on into the fourth, fifth, and sixth Baker tests because whether to
support Israel with military aid is not only a decision committed to the
political branches, but a decision those branches have already made."" In
particular, the court was "mindful of the potential for causing international
embarrassment were a federal court to undermine foreign policy decisions in
the sensitive context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict." 8 2
These decisions were emblematic. Similar logic was used to dismiss
claims involving or implicating a wide variety of foreign policy issues,83 from
claims of failure to comply with the War Powers Resolution,84 to claims
arising from nuclear testing, 85 to challenges to the constitutionality of the
North American Free Trade Agreement." In 1999, Jack Goldsmith counted
"several dozen political question dismissals in foreign relations contexts" in
the years following Baker." Many more followed in the decade and a half
since.

78. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 2007).
79. Id. at 982 (quoting Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 559 (9th Cir. 2005)).
80. Id. at 982-83.
81. Id. at 983.
82. Id. at 984.
83. See FRANCK, supra note 47, at 45-60 (collecting cases); Goldsmith, supra note 42, at
1402-03 (collecting cases).
84. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340-41 (D.D.C. 1987).
85. Antolok v. United States, 873 F.2d 369, 383-84 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("It would require our
invasion of their sphere for us to make the determination that they were wrong, and it is against
that very invasion that the political question doctrine protects the political realm from judicial
invasion.").
86. Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1314 (1Ith Cir. 2001) (finding
"that the Constitution's clear assignment of authority to the political branches of the Government
over our nation's foreign affairs and commerce counsels against an intrusive role for this court in
overseeing the actions of the President and Congress in this matter").
87. Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 1403.
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Political Question Critics and Defenders

While the Supreme Court may have been ignoring the way the lower
courts were expanding the political question doctrine, scholars were not. The
lower courts' apparent eagerness to avoid foreign affairs cases subjected them
and the political question doctrine to considerable criticism.
For example, in one of the most famous critiques, Thomas Franck argued
that "the abdicationist tendency, primarily expounded in what has become
known as the 'political-question doctrine,' is not only not required by but
wholly incompatible with American constitutional theory."" As Franck
explained, "[a] foreign policy exempt from judicial review is tantamount to
governance by men and women emancipated from the bonds of law." 89 Worse
though, explained Franck, the doctrine as it stood left far too much discretion
to individual judges, creating "a state of jurisprudential chaos,"90 or
"jurisprudential incoherence." 9 1
For Jack Goldsmith, the post-Baker political question doctrine "became a

discretionary tool for courts to abstain whenever they decide, based on an
independent analysis of U.S. foreign relations, that an adjudication would
harm U.S. foreign relations or the political branches' conduct of those
relations." 92 "[U]nder the guise ofjudicial modesty," the courts have used the
doctrine "to alter the scope of federal foreign relations law" in ways neither
desirable nor legitimate. 93 Rather than removing themselves from foreign
policy questions, judges had inserted themselves into them, agglomerating to
themselves the authority to determine which policies to review and which to
avoid. A "new formalism" was needed, Goldsmith argued, that would, among
other things, reduce judicial discretion and restrain use of the political
question doctrine. 94
Together with others, these critics also began to chip away at the
theoretical case for a broad foreign affairs political question doctrine, 95
explaining the impossibility of cleanly dividing cases into foreign and
88. FRANCK, supra note 47, at 4-5. "What is the point of a carefully calibrated system of
divided and limited power if those who exercise authority can secure an automatic exemption
from its strictures merely by playing the foreign-affairs trump?," Franck asked. Id at 5.
89. Id. at 8.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 9.
92. Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 1402.
93. Id. at 1396.
94. Id. at 1396-97.
95. See generally Michael J. Glennon, ForeignAffairs and the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine,
83 AM. J. INTL L. 814, 814-16 (1989) (rebutting several purported justifications of the political
question doctrine).
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domestic affairs categories 96 and questioning the assumptions that the
consequences or dangers of judicial involvement in foreign relations cases is
somehow greater than others,97 that courts are less expert in foreign than
domestic cases,98 and that the United States should always speak with "one
voice" in foreign affairs. 99 With these assumptions undermined, they argued,
the case for a special foreign affairs political question doctrine seemed to
disintegrate.
Other scholars continued to defend broad judicial abstention in foreign
relations. 00 In some cases, they took on criticisms of the Baker factors, but
used those criticisms to smooth the doctrine's rough edges rather than to
undermine it entirely. The political question doctrine they advocated was
refined, but still broad. Thus Jide Nzelibe critiques the assumptions that
foreign relations lack judicially manageable standards, requires a single
voice, or involves unusually high stakes, but nonetheless defends a still broad
political question doctrine on institutional competence grounds, arguing that
the political branches may be better situated to follow the shifting meaning
of international law and that the courts lack the authority to effectuate their
decisions in foreign affairs.' 0' Daniel Abebe questions the assumptions
underlying the one voice justification for the doctrine, particularly whether it

96. "At the end of the twentieth century, in a world so interdependent that the flow of
persons, goods, and ideas between states is almost as ordinary as between states of our Union, no
'affair' is any longer exclusively denominable as 'foreign.' [E]very 'foreign' expenditure of lives
and treasure, has significant domestic repercussions. The elements of these mixed domesticforeign affairs often cannot be disentangled even in theory, let alone in practice." FRANCK, supra
note 47, at 9; see also Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (ForeignAffairs) Constitution, 63
OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 675-86 (2002) (arguing that in an era of globalization, a broad political question
no longer makes sense).
97. See FRANCK, supra note 47, at 50-58; Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 1414; Price, supra
note 51, at 346-47 (arguing that the courts are ill-placed to determine if any of those dangers are
truly likely); Spiro, supra note 96, at 678-82.
98. See FRANCK, supra note 47, at 46-48; Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 1416-18; Price,
supra note 51, at 330-31 (suggesting courts gain the needed expertise by deciding cases).
99. See Daniel Abebe, One Voice or Many? The PoliticalQuestion DoctrineandAcoustic
Dissonance in Foreign Affairs, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 233-34 (2012); Goldsmith, supra note
42, at 1426-27; Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the ForeignAffairs Constitution, 41
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 130-34 (2009); David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953,
1023-32 (2014) (and scholars cited there); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89
IOWA L. REV. 941, 964-66 (2004).
100. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understandingof War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 300-01 (1996); see also Aziz Z. Huq, The
NegotiatedStructuralConstitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1605 n.38 (2014); cf Aziz Z. Huq,
Removal as a PoliticalQuestion, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2013).
101. See generallyNzelibe, supra note 99.
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is really necessary when the United States exercises hegemonic power.102
Abebe defends its use though when the United States faces competition from
other powers in international relations.1 03

B.

Zivotofsky andAfter

1. Zivotofsky I and II
It was in the shadows cast by the broad foreign affairs political question
doctrine and scholarly debates over its wisdom and legitimacy that
Menachem Zivotofsky's claim was argued. In 2002, as part of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Congress provided that, when an American
citizen was born in Jerusalem and he or she (or their legal guardian) so
requested, the U.S. Department of State would list Israel as his or her place
of birth.1 04 This ran contrary to longstanding Executive Branch policy that the
United States took no position on the sovereignty of Jerusalem and that only
Jerusalem should be listed on passports. As a result, President George W.
Bush issued a statement when signing the Act into law, observing that the
Jerusalem provision would "interfere with the President's constitutional
authority to . .. determine the terms on which recognition is given to foreign
states."'
After Menachem Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem, his parents, American
citizens, requested that his passport list Israel as his place of birth.0 6 When
the State Department refused, the Zivotofskys sued.' 07 The case was
dismissed, with the majority in the D.C. Circuit finding that the dispute
presented a political question. 0 As Judge Griffith explained, recognition of
foreign governments is a power textually committed by the Constitution to
the President, and the State Department's challenged policy with regard to
102. See generallyAbebe, supra note 99.
103. Id. at 237.
104. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 214(d),
116 Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002).
105. GEORGE W. BUSH, Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Year 2003, in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: GEORGE W.
BUSH 1697, 1698 (2005).
106. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2009),
vacatedandremandedsub nom. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofskyv. Clinton (Zivotofsky 1), 132 S. Ct.
1421 (2012).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1233.
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Jerusalem was accordingly nonjusticiable.1 09 Judge Edwards added a
concurrence, agreeing that the State Department's policy was a valid use of
the President's recognition power but disagreeing that it was a political
question." 0
In Zivotofsky v. Clinton, or Zivotofsky I, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for
the majority of the Supreme Court, found the case justiciable." "[T]he
Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases properly before it, even those it
'would gladly avoid,"' the Chief Justice explained, and the political question
doctrine is only a "narrow exception.""1 2 The Court of Appeals had construed
the first Baker factor too broadly. The Court will dismiss those cases that
force it to review a question textually committed to another branch, Chief
Justice Roberts explained." 3 But that is not the claim Zivotofsky raised.
Instead, the question raised by Zivotofsky's claim was one of constitutional
interpretation: Which branch, Congress or the President, has the authority to
determine the "place of birth" notation on U.S. passports?11 4 Once it is
determined which branch has the authority to make that policy judgment, then
policy decisions of that branch will be nonjusticiable."
Notably, in discussing application of the political question doctrine, Chief
Justice Roberts mentioned only the first two Baker factors-"a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department" and "a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it."" 6 The other four-the avoidance of judicial policymaking,
the need to avoid embarrassment, the need for finality, or concerns about
maintaining "one voice" in foreign affairs"'-are notably omitted. The
implication that those four factors were no longer valid was not lost on Justice
Sotomayor, who wrote a concurrence with the main purpose of resuscitating
them."8
After remand, appeal, and certiorari, the Supreme Court was again faced
with Menachem Zivotofsky's claim in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, or Zivotofsky IIthis time, on the merits." 9 Which branch, the President or Congress, had
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 1231-33.
Id. at 1233-45.
Zivotofsky I, 132 S. Ct. at 1431.
Id. at 1427 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
Zivotofsky I, 132 S. Ct. at 1431-35.
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
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ultimate authority to determine the country or city listed as a place of birth in
the passports of American citizens? Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
found the question of whether to list "Jerusalem" or "Israel" on a passport to
be a function of the recognition power, itself part of the exclusive presidential
power to "receive ambassadors and other public ministers."1 20 "[T]he Nation
must have a single policy regarding which governments are legitimate in the
eyes of the United States and which are not,"121 Justice Kennedy explained.
All means of recognition-receiving a foreign ambassador, negotiating a
treaty, nominating a U.S. ambassador, and opening diplomatic channels-are
within the President's ultimate control.1 22 "Recognition is a topic on which
the Nation must 'speak . . . with one voice, '123 writes Justice Kennedy, and

"[t]hat voice must be the President's."1 24 As such, wrote Justice Kennedy,
"Congress may not pass a law, speaking in its own voice, that effects formal
recognition," and "it may not force the President himself to contradict his
earlier statement."1 25 Congress's passport requirements regarding Jerusalem
were invalid.
For Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting, the breadth of the majority's ruling
was "stark."1 26 "Assertions of exclusive and preclusive power leave the
Executive 'in the least favorable of constitutional postures,' and such claims
have been 'scrutinized with caution' throughout this Court's history."1 27 "For
our first 225 years, no President prevailed when contradicting a statute in the
field of foreign affairs."1 28 The majority's view, recognizing an exclusive
presidential recognition and disabling congressional action, was thus a
"perilous step." 2 9
Justice Scalia, also dissenting, argued for a narrower result that would
have left the full contours of Executive and of congressional power
ambiguous.13 0 While he thought the evidence might suggest concurrent
presidential and congressional powers over recognition,' 3 ' Justice Scalia saw
120. Id. at 2085-87.
121. Id. at 2086.
122. Id. at 2085-86.
123. Id. at 2086 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2095.
126. Id. at 2113.
127. Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640, 638 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2116.
130. Id. at 2116-23.
131. Id. at 2118.
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no need to answer that question definitively. "[T]he Constitution may well
deny Congress power to recognize,"132 but a passport requirement passed by
Congress was not, in his view, an act of recognition. Regardless of the scope
of the President's recognition power, the President needed to comply with
Congress's requirements.
2.

Future Sequels

Zivotofsky I's narrowing of the political question doctrine, coupled with
Zivotofsky II's broad, conclusive recognition of an exclusive Executive
power, suggests that unresolved questions regarding the boundaries of
Executive and congressional powers may now be resolved.' 3 3 More
importantly, they highlight a possibility that seems to have previously been
discounted: Many seem to have assumed that a narrower political question
doctrine would subject the branches to greater scrutiny, increase space to
contest government policies, and reduce the space for unilateral presidential
or congressional action. A narrower political question doctrine would be too
small a shield for a President or Congress to stand behind and defend foreign
policy actions. Zivotofsky I and II, though, reveal that the opposite is just as
likely-that, once the political question shield is avoided, the Court can go
the other way as well, recognizing broad contours to Executive or
congressional power that do not simply remove their acts from judicial view,
but that cut off all scrutiny, constitutionally validating them. 3 4 More
problematic, Zivotofsky I and II demonstrate how resolving a constitutional
separation of powers question can affect substantive political debates,
removing avenues different voices would otherwise use to be heard. Three
examples-(1) congressional interactions with foreign leaders, (2)
congressional limitations of the use of the military, including the War Powers
Resolution, and (3) Executive agreements-can demonstrate the potential
democracy-reducing effects of the current doctrines.

132. Id. at 2121.
133. See Goldsmith, supra note 11, at 114 ("These and other elements of the analytically
promiscuous decision will influence separation-of-powers disputes far beyond the recognition
context.").
134. Cf Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual
Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 64 (2014)
("Furthermore, if one is concerned about the growth of executive power, one should not assume
that more robust judicial review will be a corrective, because it is possible, if not probable, that
courts will end up legitimating many exercises of executive authority.").
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a. CongressionalInteractions with ForeignLeaders
This is the area most clearly affected by the two Zivotofsky decisions.
Despite well-worn dicta that the Executive is the sole organ of intercourse
with foreign nations,135 members of Congress have, from time-to-time,
communicated directly with foreign leaders in an effort to influence U.S.
foreign policy. Two recent instances present good examples. The first is
Speaker of the House Boehner's invitation to Israeli Prime Minister
Binyamin Netanyahu discussed above.1 36 The Speaker's invitation without
Executive Branch approval was part of a broader debate about U.S. policy
with regard to Iran, and, specifically, the then-ongoing negotiations over the
future of Iran's nuclear program. It was clearly designed to give voice and a
platform to those in Congress and their constituents who favored a harderline on Iran and opposed the deal that was reportedly being negotiated. As
part of the same debate, Senator Tom Cotton sent a letter on behalf of fortyseven Senators to the leaders of Iran, explaining the potential constitutional
effect of a deal made only by the President and the possibilities under U.S.
law that a future Congress or President could revoke it.1 37 While the BoehnerNetanyahu invitation was an attempt to create space for domestic opponents
of the negotiations to gain domestic support and thus influence U.S. policy,
the Cotton letter was an attempt by Senators opposed to the deal to reassert
their authority within the negotiations, suggesting to Iranian leaders that, even
if their formal approval would not be needed, it might be wise to take their
concerns into consideration.
In the cases of both the Boehner-Netanyahu invitation and the Cotton
letter, observers raised questions about the wisdom and constitutionality of
the tactics.1 38 High on critics' list of concerns were the President's Article II
135. See, e.g., Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ("The
President [is] ... the Nation's organ for foreign affairs."); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (creating in dicta the so-called "sole-organ" doctrine, which
implies an exclusive right of the Executive in foreign relations).
136. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
137. Cotton and 46 Fellow Senators to Send Open Letter to the Leaders of the Islamic
Republic
of
Iran,
ARK.
SENATOR
TOM
COTTON
(Mar.
9,
2015),
http://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=pressrelease&id=120. Senator Cotton later added another
Senator to the list, rounding out the final number to forty-seven; see Sean Sullivan, With Iran
Letter, Tom Cotton Emerges as Leading GOP National Security Hawk, WASH. POST (Mar. 11,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/with-iran-letter-tom-cotton-emerges-as-

leading-gop-national-security-hawk/2015/03/11/4ce05a4e-c74f-l le4-al996cb5e63819d2_story.html.
138. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Cobbs, Why Boehner's Invite to Netanyahu is Unconstitutional,
REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/03/01/netanyahu-invite-is-a-

24

ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

power to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers"13 9 and the
President's constitutional role in negotiating with foreign states.1 40 Critics
also, as they often do under those circumstances, trotted out the Logan Act,
which makes it a felony for an unauthorized citizen to communicate with
foreign officials.141 In general though, those legal and policy questions were
left to the public to decide. The wisdom and legality of the invitation and
letter would be tested at the ballot box. And these methods of resolution had
arguably worked over the years, constraining members of Congress to test
the boundaries of their power very rarely. Critics' quick turn to a tiny number
of precedents-Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Syria 4 2 and Speaker Jim
Wright's negotiations with the Sandinista government in Nicaragual43
proves as much.
After Zivotofsky I and II though, that political mode of resolution seems
outdated. As described above, the Court in Zivotofsky II drew a broad,
exclusive presidential recognition power, in part, from the President's Article
II power to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers."1 4 4 The Court
also noted the President's functionally exclusive power to negotiate with
foreign officials 45 and emphasized the importance of the United States
speaking with one voice.1 46 If Zivotofsky I suggests that the constitutionality
of the Boehner-Netanyahu invitation and the Cotton letter are not political
questions,1 4 7 Zivotofsky II strongly suggests that both would
symptom-of-boehners-grudge-match-against-the-u-s-constitution/; see also Reena Flores, John
Kerry Slams "Unconstitutional" GOP Letter to Iran, CBS NEWS (Mar. 15, 2015, 9:16 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/j ohn-kerry-will-not-apologize-for-unconstitutional-gop-letter/;
Peter Spiro, GOPIranLetter MightBe Unconstitutional.Is It also Criminal?,OPINIo JURIS (Mar.
9, 2015, 11:41 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/03/09/gop-iran-letter-might-be-unconstitutionalis-it-also-criminal/.
139. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
140. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
141. Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2012).
142. Hassan M. Fattah & Graham Bowley, Pelosi Meets with Syrian Leader, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 4, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/04/world/middleeast/04cnd-pelosi.html?_r=0.
143. Neil A. Lewis, Wright Has Talks with Both Partiesin Nicaragua War, N.Y. TIMES (NOV.
13, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/13/world/wright-has-talks-with-both-parties-innicaragua-war.html.
144. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S.
Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015).
145. .Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2086 ("The Constitution thus assigns the President means to
effect recognition on his own initiative. Congress, by contrast, has no constitutional power that
would enable it to initiate diplomatic relations with a foreign nation.").
146. See supra note 123.
147. Finding a plaintiff with standing may still prove difficult in cases like these and may
serve as sufficient protection of constitutional ambiguity.

49:0001]

POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

25

unconstitutionally invade exclusive powers of the President. Whatever one
thinks about the wisdom of each of those strategies, it should be clear that
eliminating them entirely from the constitutional toolbox would limit, rather
than promote, further debate of U.S.-Iran policy. Given the President's
effective control over negotiation with Iran and implementation of a deal, it
could reduce the space for debate considerably.' 48
Not everyone would read Zivotofsky IIso broadly, and a future court could
always find language in that opinion suggesting more respect for these types
of congressional foreign policy-making.1 49 The point though is that after
Zivotofsky I and II, a judicial decision foreclosing these tactics is a serious
possibility. Nothing in current doctrine would guarantee that a court wouldn't
resolve such disputes in exactly that way. If that sort of political space is to
be guaranteed, some other doctrine is needed. And even if disputes precisely
like these never made it to the courts-perhaps for lack of plaintiffs with
standing-Zivotofsky I and II narrow the space for constitutional
disagreements over the invitation. Future cases applying Zivotofsky II might
continue to expand the President's exclusive powers to communicate U.S.
foreign policy. Eventually, the constitutional argument in favor of an
invitation by the Speaker to address Congress or a letter by groups of
Senators, unauthorized by the Executive Branch, may seem difficult or
implausible enough to make such an invitation or letter too politically risky
to extend or send.
b.

Congressionalregulation of war

In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution ("WPR") over the
President's veto.15 0 The WPR creates a series of reporting and procedural

148. Of course, in this case, Congress's relatively small role in the debate was largely its own
doing, first by delegating so much control over the sanctions regime to the President and in so
doing, creating a supermajority requirement to enact new sanctions over the President's veto, and
second, by seemingly conceding that the deal need not take the form of an Article II treaty
requiring Senate approval. Broad delegations to the Executive are the modem reality, however,
and courts must weigh the effects of judicial decisions with it in mind.
149. See Ryan Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy After Zivotofsky, LAWFARE (June 15, 2015,
9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/legislative-diplomacy-after-zivotofsky (explaining how
the constitutionality of both the Boehner-Netanyahu invitation and the Cotton letter could be
squared with the Court's opinion in Zivotofsky II); see also Michael C. Dorf, Zivotofsky may Be
Remembered as Limiting Exclusive PresidentialPower, DORF ON LAW (June 8,2015, 12:52 PM),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2015/06/zivotofsky-may-be-remembered-as.html. But see Goldsmith,
supra note 11, at 132 ("The problem with this potentially limiting formalist principle is that
Zivotofsky II did not apply it.").
150. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2012).
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requirements designed to "insure that the collective judgment of both the
Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities.""' Among other things, it requires Presidents
to report to Congress within forty-eight hours when U.S. Armed Forces are
introduced "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances."1 52 The WPR further
requires Congressional authorization for armed forces to remain beyond sixty
days and forbids implying authorization from appropriations bills and U.S.
treaties.1 53 Since the WPR's passage, Congress and the President have fallen
into a rough constitutional settlement over its application. No President has
accepted the constitutionality of the WPR, but despite some notable
exceptions,1 54 Presidents have complied with its procedural requirements.
The rough constitutional settlement between the President and Congress
has not been maintained through the judicial review. When courts have
considered claimed violations of the WPR, they have dismissed the claims as
nonjusticiable political questions because the war powers were textually
committed to the President and Congress,'55 because resolution of the claim
would require fact-finding beyond the court's capacity, 56 because terms like
"hostilities" lack judicially manageable standards, 1 or because judicial
involvement might risk embarrassment for the United States or its ability to
speak with one voice in relations with other states.'15 Instead, the rough
constitutional settlement has been maintained by politics.1 59
Id. § 1541(a).
Id. §§ 1542, 1543(a).
Id. § 1544(b).
See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role
in
Libya
Operation,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
15,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/us/politics/i6powers.html.
155. See Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 511-15 (D.D.C. 1990) (stating, among other things,
that "the Constitution appears to grant the executive and legislative branches certain powers which
either directly or indirectly affect the conduct of foreign affairs . . . .").
156. See Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1251 (1984).
157. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring).
158. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340 (D.D.C. 1987).
159. The importance of political control seems apparent in the debates over the intervention
in Libya and its aftermath. President Obama's failure to report to Congress sixty days after the
start of U.S. military involvement and subsequent administration attempts at justification were
subjected to considerable criticism. See, e.g., Savage & Landler, supra note 154. While that
criticism seems to have done little with regard to U.S. involvement in Libya, it does seem to have
an effect on later justifications for the United States' conflict with the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS). Concerns about the WPR's sixty-day clock seem to have played a role in the
administration's decision to justify military action as already authorized by Congress in prior
151.
152.
153.
154.
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That settlement over the WPR seems upended by Zivotofsky I. Under the
logic of Zivotofsky I, only military policy questions themselves would raise
political questions requiring judicial abstention. Thus, whether the use of
force was desirable, perhaps whether the actions on the ground amounted to
hostilities, or even whether a particular enemy fell within the scope of a prior
authorization might be questions best left for Congress or the President. The
threshold question though, whether Congress could impose these
requirements and constraints on the President would be, according to
Zivotofsky I, a constitutional question-one the courts would be required to
decide. By itself, that result might be one critics of the broad post-Baker
political question doctrine might applaud.1 60
But Zivotofsky II might give those same critics of abstention in WPR cases
some pause. Justice Kennedy's logic with regard to an expansive, exclusive
presidential recognition power seems equally applicable to the President's
powers as Commander-in-Chief. As with recognition, Congress may have
powers to influence the conduct of war-the power to declare war, to make
rules and regulations for the military, to grant letters of marque and reprisal,
to make rules regarding captures 6 -but only the President can bring them
into effect and the President remains necessary to send and direct troops in
battle. Under the logic of Zivotofsky II, some congressional regulations,
particularly those dealing with the direction of troops and tactics, would seem
preempted by the "exclusive" presidential Commander-in-Chief power.
Perhaps the WPR's reporting requirements would survive. Other
requirements, including removing troops in the absence of Congressional
authorization after sixty-days, seem likely to fail. And while Presidents have
long-claimed that such requirements were unconstitutional, the absence of
any court decision so holding left Presidents uncertain how the public might
react if they ignored it entirely. Arguably, the requirements to withdraw acted
as an incentive for Presidents to comply with other aspects of the WPR, like
the reporting requirement. A judicial decision disabling the withdrawal
authorizations to use force against Al Qaeda and Iraq. See, e.g., Ed O'Keefe & Paul Kane, House
Approves Obama's Iraq-SyriaMilitary Strategy Amid Skepticism, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/congress-poised-to-approve-obamas-iraq-syria-

military-strategy-amid-skepticism/2014/09/17/c2494df2-3e85-1
8141703bbf6f story.html.

e4-b0ea-

160. In fact, criticism of the courts' abstention in WPR cases has been a key driver of many
of the political question doctrine's critics. See generally Thomas M. Franck, Courts and Foreign

Policy, 83 FOREIGN POL'Y 66 (1991) (criticizing the court in Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333
(D. D.C. 1987); Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine, 83 Am.

J. INT'L L. 814 (1989) (same).
161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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requirement might upend the balance, taking a political tool away from
Congress, and giving the President little reason to comply with the reporting
requirements as well (even if they were held valid).
And the WPR is just one example of a regulation that might be ripe for
review. In its debates over an authorization for use of force against the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Congress has considered both time-limits and
the prohibition of ground forces. 6 2 Both look suspect after Zivotofsky I and
II. Restrictions on geography too might tread too close to the President's
exclusive power to direct troops against the enemy.
c.

Executive agreements

Although the Constitution only describes one process, in Article II, for
making binding international commitments-namely that the President
negotiates treaties, and if two-thirds of the Senate agree, the President ratifies
them on the United States' behalf'63 -other processes have long been used,
including Congressional-Executive Agreements (CEAs), whereby both
houses of Congress approve a treaty by majority vote, and Sole Executive
Agreements made on the President's own authority. And over time, the
importance of these other processes has increased dramatically, as the
number of CEAs and Sole Executive Agreements has come to dwarf the
number of Article II treaties' 64 and as the ranks of CEAs have come to include
most significant economic agreements, including the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and commitments to the World Trade
Organization.16

The courts, for their part, have long treated the scope of these options as a
non-justiciable political question. In the case of NAFTA, for example, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that "with respect to international
commercial agreements such as NAFTA, the question ofjust what constitutes
a 'treaty' requiring Senate ratification presents a nonjusticiable political
question." 6 6 That court, applying Baker, reasoned that the Constitution
granted broad powers over foreign relations, that the choice between different
162. Jeremy W. Peters, Obama to Seek War Power Bill From Congress, to FightISIS, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/1 1/us/obama-to-seek-war-power-bill-

from-congress-to-fight-isis.html?_r=0.
163. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
164. Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1258, 1260 (2008) (surveying the number
of treaties entered into, versus the number of CEAs concluded, between 1980 and 2000).
165. Id. at 1247.
166. Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001).

49:0001]

POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

29

types of agreement was beyond the court's expertise, and that a decision
against the government risked finality, failed to give the other branches due
respect, and threatened to embarrass the United States in the eyes of the
world-in other words, a standard post-Baker foreign-affairs politicalquestion decision.' 6 7
In the absence of judicial review, as in the areas described above, 68 it has
been left to politics and the branches themselves to work out the contours of
each category of agreement. Congress passed the Case-Zablocki Act, 169
which requires the Executive branch to report agreements to it, as a guarantee
that regardless of form, Congress would remain informed. And in certain
instances, the Senate has pushed back (sometimes successfully) against the
President's choices, demanding that arms control agreements go through the
Article II treaty process 70 or that certain Sole Executive Agreements get
Senate approval.' 7 ' In general, the political branches seem to have reached a
rough settlement that while CEAs can be used for economic treaties, the
Article II process must be used for arms control, human rights, and
extradition treaties.1 72
Zivotofsky I, by narrowing the application of the first two Baker factors
and marginalizing the other four, suggests that the constitutionality of and
boundaries between these types of international agreements may be ripe for
review.1 73 Again, the threshold question is what process is required to bind

167. Id. at 1311-19.
168. See supra notes 135-162.
169. 1 U.S.C. § 112b (2012).
170. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND

MATERIALS 374 (5th ed. 2014).
171. See Bruce Ackerman & Oona A. Hathaway, Bush's Final Illusion, SLATE (Oct. 21,
2008, 4:25 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/newsandpolitics/jurisprudence/2008/10/bushs_
final illusion.html; Jack Goldsmith & Lawrence Lessig, Anti-CounterfeitingAgreement Raises
Constitutional Concerns, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/25/AR2010032502403.html;
Oona A. Hathaway & Amy
Kapczynski, Going it Alone: The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement as a Sole Executive
Agreement, ASIL INSIGHTS (Aug. 24, 2011), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/23/g
oing-it-alone-anti-counterfeiting-trade-agreement-sole-executive.
172. Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 961, 996-1002 (2001).
173. See Peter J. Spiro, Are Sole Executive Agreements Next on the Roberts Court Chopping
Block?, OPINIO JURIS (May 8, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/05/08/sole-executiveagreements-next-roberts-court-chopping-block/. Notably, there has already been talk of lawsuits
to challenge the constitutionality of the process behind the Iran-Nuclear deal. See John Yoo, Why
Obama's Executive Action on Iran Does Not Violate the Law, NAT'L REv. (July 26, 2015, 6:01
PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/421621/why-obamas-executive-action-iran-does-
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the United States internationally. Zivotofsky I echoed Justice Powell's and
Justice Brennan's decisions in Goldwater v. Carter on the treaty power that
such threshold questions were constitutional questions for the courts rather
than political questions for the other branches.' 74 But while some scrutiny and
definition from the courts may improve the treaty-making process by
guaranteeing more voices could be heard in the debate, Zivotofsky II reminds
us that the doctrinal question may not be answered that way and that a
decision on the merits could either eliminate some of these categories
completely (at least for some subjects) or broadly validate them. Either
possibility could eliminate voices from the debate entirely: A stricter rule
favoring Article II treaties over CEAs would remove the House of
Representatives and national majorities from the debate, making some
agreements with majority national support, but not that of two-thirds of
Senators (for example, NAFTA"'), impossible. A stricter rule against Sole
Executive Agreements would limit the President's, and, in turn, the general
electorate's, voice. The threat of a Sole Executive Agreement can be a
powerful tool to force Congress to negotiate over issues that might be of
general national concern. Recognition of a broader grant of Presidential
power to choose the type of agreement, including a Sole Executive
agreement, could eliminate the voices represented by Congress. The current
constitutional compromise creates a complex, imperfect, but dynamic
dialogue between and across the political branches on international
agreements. If the courts simplify it, they may also destroy its vibrancy.
3.

Toward Pluralism?

The effects of Zivotofsky I and II on the three examples above, (1)
congressional interactions with foreign leaders, (2) congressional limitations
of the use of the military, including the War Powers Resolution, and (3)
Executive agreements, suggest the need for a doctrine capable of protecting
the channels for political debate. If the concern with the political question
doctrine post-Baker was that it eliminated debate by hiding government
actions from scrutiny, the concern post-Zivotofsky I and II is that it may
not-violate-law-john-yoo. So, a politically-charged challenge to the process of making
international agreements may not be far-fetched.
174. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky 1), 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1425 (2012);
see also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Id. at 1006-07
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. See H.R. 3450 (103rd): North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act,
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/1 03-1993/h575 (last visited Jan. 4, 2017)
(showing that NAFTA was passed by a simple majority by a vote of 234 to 200).
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eliminate debate by limiting the entry-points for substantive political debate
altogether. This Article proposes a new, pluralist or politics-reinforcing
political question doctrine to protect the space for congressional-Presidential
disagreement.
But how worrisome are these possibilities really? Do we really need a new
political question doctrine to solve them? One answer to these concerns is
that the Court rarely decides such cases, first because they are rarely so neatly
constructed, with Congress and the President so clearly on opposite sides,"'
and second because discretionary certiorari and the difficulty of finding
plaintiffs with standing in separation-of-powers cases make at least Supreme
Court decisions in such cases unlikely. If we imagine the risk of a branchpower-enhancing decision in a separation of powers case as 50% (we could,
of course, imagine many other possibilities), such decisions should be rare.
Perhaps we should worry more about the certainty of leaving the political
branches beyond scrutiny entirely through a political question doctrine, than
the potentiality of insulating them through decisions on the scope of
constitutional powers.
It is unclear exactly how much of a threat to scrutiny, debate, and dissent
each possibility entails. The above might be a fair response to that
uncertainty. There are a few reasons though to be less confident in the postZivotofsky status quo. First, with the rise of the administrative state, it may
not actually be the case that standing for separation of powers cases is always
so rare. As Noel Canning'77 demonstrates, individuals may now be affected
by separation of powers questions in ways that give rise to standing. Second,
even if the decisions are rare, they can have impact in the separation of
powers context well-beyond their specific application. Because of the paucity
of cases answering separation of powers questions, particularly in the field of
foreign affairs, it has generally been left to the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
to opine for the Executive branch on the meaning of those cases; and, by all
accounts, the OLC has expanded the scope of precedents supporting
exclusive, unreviewable Executive power. Even if the Court never again
decided a key separation of powers case, Zivotofsky II would undoubtedly
stand in future OLC memoranda for a range of exclusive Executive Branch
powers, many well beyond the recognition context of Zivotofsky II itself.7 1

176. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2113 (2015)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
177. N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
178. See Harlan Grant Cohen, Zivotofsky II's Two Visionsfor Foreign Relations Law, 109
AJILUNBOUND 10 (2015); Goldsmith, supranote 11, at 133-46; Jack Goldsmith, Why Zivotofsky
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And while Congress may be less able to expand the boundaries of decisions
recognizing congressional exclusivity-the President may be better situated
to respond quickly and aggressively to congressional power-grabs than the
other way around-it may be able to do so in some cases. The Senate has, for
example, successfully pushed back on the President's attempt to ratify major
arms control agreements as CEAs rather than Article II treaties requiring the
Senate's advice and consent.1 79 But, finally, even if the risks of such branchpower-enhancing decisions are at any given time small, they are much more
permanent. When courts choose to avoid a question because of the political
question doctrine, they do insulate it from judicial scrutiny. They do not
insulate it from all scrutiny though; having left the constitutional question
undecided, the political branches themselves, the media, and the public can
still argue about the constitutionality of each branch's actions-as they have
in cases that have avoided review, like torture's and targeted killing.'' At the
extremes, the President can refuse to execute laws he deems unconstitutional,
and Congress can threaten impeachment if it believes the President has acted
illegally. And depending on how the courts initially avoided the case, they
may have done nothing to preclude courts from deciding the question on
some future occasion.
III.

REDISCOVERING A POLITICS-REINFORCING POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE

This Part develops a different political question doctrine from prior onesa pluralist, or politics-reinforcing political question doctrine designed, not to
protect government decisions from judicial scrutiny, but instead to protect the
channels for democratic debate. It is a political question doctrine designed to
foster robust debate rather than eliminate it. Part A follows a variety of paths
suggesting the courts should be careful to protect and nurture the space for
political debate in the system of governance. Part B develops a politics-

Is a Significant Victory for the Executive Branch, LAWFARE (June 8, 2015, 3:44 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-zivotofsky-significant-victory-executive-branch.
179. See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 170, at 374.
180. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd to 2000dd-1 (2006)) (prohibiting inhumane interrogation techniques).
181. Compare Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46 (D.D.C. 2011) (rejecting challenge
to inclusion on target list, for, among other reasons, posing a "political question"), with Charlie
Savage, Senators Press Holder on Use of Military Force, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/us/politics/senators-press-holder-on-use-of-military-forceon-us-soil.html (describing congressional frustration with the Obama administration over targeted
drone strikes).
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reinforcing political question doctrine that can give doctrinal force to those
principles.
A. PluralistClues
The politics-reinforcing political question doctrine can be found at the
intersection of three paths of constitutional thought: (1) structural arguments
that the Constitution and the institutions it creates are designed to guarantee
that different voices, different parts of the electorate, will be heard in public
policy debates; (2) arguments that judicial review is designed to monitor and
maintain the fairness and openness of the political process; and (3) arguments
that the courts should be careful in using their power not to stamp out political
debate too soon or without strong justification. These paths are not
completely separate; they sometimes run in parallel and cross at various
points. Each of these paths though eventually leads off in its own direction,
in some cases, suggesting more judicial restraint than this Article would
support. Reading the three strands of arguments together actually produces a
more moderate form of restraint, a politics-reinforcing political question
doctrine that incorporates and balances the principles of each. And while the
resulting doctrine invokes some of the language of the existing political
question doctrine or cases, it will become clear that its underlying logic is
quite different.
1. Structural Protections for Debate
The idea that the structure of the government, the separation of powers
across three branches and two houses of Congress, and the choice of multiple
methods of election and representation is designed to create space for
political debate is first visible in the Federalist Papers. Pointing specifically
to Federalist Papers numbers 51 and 60, Bruce Ackerman observes: "[t]he
brilliant, but paradoxical, way that Publius makes this point is by proliferating
the modes of representation governing normal politics."1 8 2 As Ackerman

explains:
In Publian hands, the separation of powers operates as a complex
machine which encourages each official to question the extent to
which other constitutional officials are successfully representing the
People's true political wishes. Thus, while each officeholder will
predictably insist that he speaks with the authentic accents of the
182. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1028 (1984).
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People themselves, representatives in other institutions will
typically find it in their interest to deny that their rivals have indeed
represented the People in a fully satisfactory way.1 83

In other words, the separation of powers is not just a negative force
designed to check the ambitions of any one branch. Fragmenting power
between and across the branches is actually designed to positively enhance
debate, multiplying the voices that can be heard through each one. 8 4 The
House of Representatives, Senate, and President are elected in different ways
from different size electorates. Different interests will be better represented
in the more frequent, more local elections to the House, the less frequent,
statewide election to the Senate, and the more national elections to the
President. With overlapping authority, each one gives some portion of the
electorate a chance to be heard in the key debates of the day. The clich6d
example is international trade. As the story goes, congress-people, rationally
responding to the electoral incentives of frequent, local elections will tend to
support protectionist policies that may help local industry at the expense of
the broader welfare; the President, elected nationally based on state-wide
majorities, is more insulated from those local concerns and will instead favor
more liberalized trade if it will benefit national consumers and improve the
overall economy.
As Bryan Garsten has argued, "a chief purpose of representative
government is to multiply and challenge governmental claims to represent
the people."' National, state, and local interests, along with all the varied
interests that might be better represented at one level or the other, each have
a chance to be heard. None automatically win over the others, and each will
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 16, at 712 ("But constitutional ground rules
also create relatively stable and nonnegotiable structures that enable political competition to
emerge and endure."). This argument for the separation of powers echoes frequent arguments in
favor of federalism. See, e.g., Robert S. Schapiro, Toward a Theory ofInteractiveFederalism, 91
IOWA L. REv. 243, 288-90 (2005) (arguing that federalism encourages regulatory pluralism and,
in turn, greater political dialogue over federal and national policies); David C. Williams,
American ConstitutionalFantasies:Escapefrom Difference Through Escapefrom Government,
12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 415, 418-19 (2005) (explaining that "[f]rom the beginning, our
constitution sought to give formal representation to a plurality of different groups, considered as
groups," including through federalism).
185. Bryan Garsten, Representative Government and Popular Sovereignty, in POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION 91 (Ian Shapiro et al. eds., 2009); see also ELY, supra note 16, at 90 ("I don't

suppose it will surprise anyone to learn that the body of the original Constitution is devoted almost
entirely to structure, explaining who among the various actors-federal government, state
government, Congress, executive, judiciary has authority to do what, and going on to fill in a
good bit of detail about how these persons are selected and to conduct their business.").
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have to be considered if policies are to be enacted and made effective. "The
Constitution's various moves to break up and counterpoise governmental
decision and enforcement authority, not only between the national
government and the states but among the three departments of the national
government as well,""' John Hart Ely explained, guaranteed that "no faction
or interest group would constitute a majority capable of exercising
control."1

7

And to some observers, history has proven the genius of this model.
Surveying the first forty years of U.S. foreign relations, Abraham Sofaer
observed that "[t]he legislative and executive branches functioned as separate
entities, but with powers over the same matters. Each was jealous of its
authority, and at times sought to increase its powers. But, as Hamilton,
Madison and others intended, neither branch prevailed consistently enough
to subordinate the other." 8
This idea, that the competition between the branches protects political
debate, has sometimes made appearances in decisions rejecting jurisdiction
on political question doctrine grounds. Declaring war powers challenges to
the first Gulf War to be political questions, Judge Lamberth of the District
Court for the District of Columbia, observed that "[t]he various provisions of
the Constitution do not grant the war power exclusively to either the
legislative or the executive branch. The powers granted to both branches,
however, enable those branches to resolve the dispute themselves."' 89 Justice
Breyer made a similar argument in his dissent in Zivotofsky I, observing that
"insofar as the controversy reflects different foreign policy views among the
political branches of Government, those branches have nonjudicial methods
of working out their differences."'9 0 As Justice Breyer explains,
The Executive and Legislative Branches frequently work out
disagreements through ongoing contacts and relationships,
involving, for example, budget authorizations, confirmation of
personnel, committee hearings, and a host of more informal
contacts, which, taken together, ensure that, in practice, Members
of Congress as well as the President play an important role in the
shaping of foreign policy. Indeed, both the Legislative Branch and
186. ELY, supra note 16, at 80.
187. Id.
188. ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE
ORIGINS xiv-xv (1976).
189. Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D.D.C. 1990).
190. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky 1), 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1441 (2012)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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the Executive Branch typically understand the need to work each
with the other in order to create effective foreign policy. In that
understanding, those related contacts, and the continuous foreign
policy-related relationship lies the possibility of working out the
kind of disagreement we see before us. 191

And the best exemplar of this argument in political question doctrine
scholarship is Jesse Choper, who has argued that courts should treat pure
separation-of-powers questions as political questions precisely because the
political branches have sufficient tools at their disposal to check each other.1 92
As will be explained later though,1 93 Choper's argument, reflected in these
cases, goes too far. The two branches may have the tools to check each other,
but they will not always be effective. While there is a strong argument that
courts should abstain when the branches are actually checking each other,
this Article argues that argument weakens in the face of branch agreement or
acquiescence. As will be explained, there are good reasons to worry that the
branches will not sufficiently check each other. In those cases, protecting
democracy and room for debate counsels judicial intervention rather than
abstention.

2.

Political Process Protective Judicial Review

This model of democratic competition between and within the political
branches has been picked up by a different strand of constitutional thought to
help explain, defend, and define the scope ofjudicial review. Judicial review,
the argument goes, is warranted when it is necessary to protect the political
process, to guarantee that it is properly giving voice to all. The most

191. Id; see also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1006 n.1 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) ("Moreover, Congress has a variety of powerful tools for influencing foreign policy
decisions that bear on treaty matters. Under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, it can regulate
commerce with foreign nations, raise and support armies, and declare war. It has power over the
appointment of ambassadors and the funding of embassies and consulates. Congress thus retains
a strong influence over the President's conduct in treaty matters.") (quoting Goldwater v. Carter,
617 F.2d 697, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wright, C.J., concurring), vacated by Goldwater, 444 U.S.
996)).
192. Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J
1457, 1466 (2005) (arguing that the judiciary should refrain from adjudicating a matter when "the
political branches may be trusted to produce a sound constitutional decision" and that the
Executive and Legislative Branches can be trusted with such decisions because of their
"competing interests").
193. See infra Part III.B.
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prominent advocate of this notion of democracy, or representationreinforcing judicial review, was John Hart Ely.
Ely built upon UnitedStates v. CaroleneProducts Co.'s famous footnote
four, in which Justice Stone suggested that "more exacting judicial scrutiny"
or "more searching judicial inquiry" might be warranted in cases where
legislation "restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation" or targets
"particular religious, or national, or racial minorities" and where "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities . . . tends seriously to curtail the

operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities."1 94 Partly as a defense of the Warren Court's jurisprudence, Ely
argued for a "representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review,"19' in
which the court would police the political process for "malfunctions"1 96 rather
than accordance with particular values. As Ely explains,
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure
that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one
is actually denied a voice or vote, representatives beholden to an
effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority
out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize
commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the
protection afforded to other groups by a representative system.197

Judicial review, Ely explained, was necessary when "either by clogging
the channels of change or by acting as accessories to majority tyranny, our
elected representatives in fact are not representing the interest of those whom
the system presupposes they are."1 98 "[A] representation-reinforcing
approach to judicial review . . . is not inconsistent with, but on the contrary
(and quite by design) entirely supportive of, the underlying premises of the
American system of representative democracy,"1 99 and "assigns judges a role
they are conspicuously well situated to fill." 2 00

194. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (internal citations
omitted).
195. ELY, supra note 16, at 88.
196. Id. at 103.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 88.
200. Id. at 102.
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Richard Pildes and Samuel Issacharoff drew from Ely's "antitrust
analogy"20 ' to develop a model of "legal oversight over democratic
politics."2 02 "Where courts can discern that existing partisan forces have
manipulated these background rules," they argued, "courts should strike
down those manipulations in order to ensure an appropriately competitive
partisan environment."20 3 But the flipside was true as well: when the political
process was not malfunctioning, when the mechanisms designed to give
voice to different interests were working, judicial review might not be
warranted. As Pildes and Issacharoff explain, "[r]ather than seeking to control
politics directly through the centralized enforcement of individual rights, we
suggest courts would do better to examine the background structure of
partisan competition. Where there is an appropriately robust market in
partisan competition, there is less justification for judicial intervention."20 4 In
much the same vein as this call for a politics-reinforcing political question
doctrine, the work of Pildes, Issacharoff, and other related scholars reflected
"the aspiration for democracy-reinforcing as opposed to democracy-limiting
judicial review."205

3.

Judicial Minimalism and Respect for Pluralism

Intersecting with these two paths of constitutional thought is a path
devoted to defining the limits of judicial review. The start of this path is
usually located in the work of James Bradley Thayer, who argued in a famous
1893 HarvardLaw Review article that a statute should only be invalidated if
its unconstitutionality is "so clear that it is not open to rational question." 2 06
The path from Thayer eventually led through Alexander Bickel, who
developed his own conception of and argument for judicial restraint. Bickel
believed that the courts play a key role in articulating fundamental values.
Judicial review though is in some tension with democratic governance, a
tension Bickel coined "the counter-majoritarian difficulty." 207 To resolve this
tension, Bickel argued that the courts should embrace a type of minimalism

&

201. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 16, at 710.
202. Id. at 717.
203. Id. at 648.
204. Id.
205. See Yen-Tu Su, Retracing PoliticalAntitrust: A Genealogy and Its Lessons, 27 J.L.
POL. 1, 9 (2011).
206. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 FARV. L. REv. 129, 144 (1893).
207. BICKEL, supra note 18, at 16-23.
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and incrementalism that would put them in dialogue with, rather than in
opposition to, the political branches. Embracing the "passive virtues" of
judicial decision-making and using a variety of techniques to avoid deciding
more than they must in particular cases, the courts could avoid overreaching,
protect their authority, and enhance the credibility of their
pronouncements.2 08 Among Bickel's passive virtues are the court's powers to
decline jurisdiction, to avoid issues for lack of ripeness, to decide issues on
procedural grounds, and important for the purposes of this article, the
political question doctrine. 20 9 The passive virtues are also often associated
with the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, which much like a politicsreinforcing political question doctrine counsels against deciding
constitutional questions whenever possible.2 10
Much like the politics-reinforcing political question doctrine endorsed
here, the passive virtues protect the space for continued democratic debate;
Bickel's justifications for the political question doctrine though is very
different from the ones described here. For Bickel, the foundation of the
political question doctrine is judicial anxiety-anxiety that the issue in a case
is too strange or too momentous and anxiety that the political branches and
people will ignore the courts. 2 1 1 These are the types of considerations that
undergird the prudential factors of the modern post-Baker political question
doctrine. But they are quite foreign to the politics-reinforcing political
question endorsed here. That doctrine is based not on any incapacity of the
judiciary, but in a concern for the health of the political process. The politicsreinforcing political question doctrine sets the courts up as guardians of the
political process, capable of intervening or demurring as necessary to
maintain the robustness of political debate. When the political process seems
broken or in need of a constitutional check, the courts should not shy away
from getting involved simply because the issues are difficult or politically
charged.
Cass Sunstein has developed a different model of judicial restraint based
on "decisional minimalism." 2 12 Sunstein suggests that courts, whenever
208. Id. at 111-200.
209. Id.
210. Justice Brandeis is credited with having espoused the modem constitutional avoidance
doctrine. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed
of.").
211. BICKEL, supra note 18, at 184.
212. SUNSTEIN, supra note 18.
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possible, decide difficult constitutional cases on as narrow grounds as
possible.2 13 Doing so leaves more room and more time for the issue to be
deliberated through politics and within society. As with a politics-reinforcing
political question doctrine, Sunstein's minimalism is meant to be
"democracy-promoting." 2 14 As Sunstein explains, "[m]inimalist courts can
provide spurs and prods to promote democratic deliberation itself." 2 15
"[D]emocracy-promoting forms of minimalism, designed to promote both
accountability and reason-giving, are appropriate and salutary judicial
intervention into political domains."216
But Sunstein's minimalism differs in two important ways from the type of
restraint described here. First, Sunstein's minimalism is substantive. Whereas
Bickel's passive virtues or a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine
would suggest avoiding the issue raised by the case, Sunstein's minimalism
decides the case, but on as narrow ground as possible. Second, Sunstein's
minimalism is triggered by the substance of the question before the courts;
the case for minimalism is strongest when politically or morally contentious
questions are at issue. A politics-reinforcing political question doctrine, on
the other hand, is blind to substance. It is instead triggered by the posture of
the political branches to one another and the relative openness of the channels
of political debate. A politics-reinforcing political question doctrine is thus
much narrower than Sunstein's minimalism; it is only triggered in a small
subset of cases in which the political branches are arguing with each other.
Whether a much broader form of democracy-promoting minimalism like
Sunstein's is desirable is well beyond the scope of this Article.
A third, different form of judicial restraint can be gleaned from the work
of Robert Cover. 217 Rather than judicial minimalism, Cover's suggestion
might better be described as judicial responsibility. Cover describes the ways
in which the law is constantly being understood and developed within the
communities who live by and with it. Those communities are, for Cover,
"jurisgenerative." 2 18 They develop accounts of the law's meaning, how the
law applies, and how it should be interpreted that help explain how and why
their members should live within it. 219 But whereas narratives of the law
213. Id. at 3.
214. Id. at 26-27.
215. Id. at 27.
216. Id. at 28.
217. Cover, supra note 15.
218. Id. at 15.
219. Id. at 46 ("Those narratives also provide resources for justification, condemnation, and
argument by actors within the group, who must struggle to live their law.").
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flower within these communities, in front of courts, those narratives are
threatened. Jurisdiction, the power to say what the law is, gives courts the
power of jurispathy, the power to kill off all narratives of the law but the one
they adopt.22 0 For Cover, wielding this legal executioner's axe is a grave
responsibility, one courts must use responsibly. As such, when courts decide
to invalidate one community's understanding of the law, they carry special
burdens of justification. As with the political question doctrine endorsed by
this Article, Cover favors a form of legal and political pluralism in which
differing views of law and policy should be encouraged and nurtured, in
which choosing one interpretation and excluding others requires strong
justification.
B.

Findinga Politics-ReinforcingPoliticalQuestion Doctrine

The case for a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine emerges
from these three broad strains of constitutional thought. A politics-reinforcing
political question doctrine explains when and how a court should exercise
restraint in order to protect the space for substantive political debate.
Discussions of the Constitution's structural protections of debate describe
a complex engine of democratic deliberation maintained by the
Constitution's plural overlapping sources of authority. For a politicsreinforcing political question doctrine, contestation between the branches
over overlapping claims of authority is not a constitutional bug to be fixed,
but a structural feature of the Constitution designed to guarantee access to the
widest range of voices on the public policies of the day.
The courts' role in maintaining those structures is inspired by theories of
representation-reinforcing judicial review. In suggesting that courts should
intervene when the channels of deliberation and representation are
malfunctioning, these theories also suggest that courts should be more
reticent when those channels are acting properly. A politics-reinforcing
political question doctrine thus teaches that where the political branches are
properly giving voice to different part of the electorate with different
interests, courts should be much warier to cut those debates off. And
delineating the exact boundaries between congressional and presidential
power can do exactly that, as the Court's decision in Zivotofsky II
demonstrates.
But representation-reinforcing judicial review also helps define a politicsreinforcing political question doctrine's limits. Whereas the modern, postBaker political question doctrine has often been assumed to support
220. Id. at 40-42.
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abstention most powerfully in cases where the President and Congress are
aligned, a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine suggests the
opposite. The point of a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine is not
to protect the products of the political process from review or dissent, but to
protect the robustness of the political process. And where the two political
branches are aligned, a court becomes the only branch that can check to make
sure voices haven't been improperly silenced and that debate hasn't been
prematurely shut down. And we have good reason to worry about
malfunctions when the political branches agree. As Ely and Justice Stone
suggested, minority voices may have insufficient protection in the political
process; particularly in foreign affairs and national security, the interests of
ethnic minorities may be too easily brushed aside by fear or anger-a
problem evidenced both in the infamous internment of Japanese-Americans
during World War II and roundups of the Muslims after September 11, 2001.
But, as David Moore has argued,22 ' we also have reasons to question whether
Congress and the President will always serve as adequate checks on each
other. Presidents and members of Congress may identify more with their
political parties than with their respective branches or constituencies.222 We
might thus worry that the political branches will too quickly find common
cause when controlled by the same political party. Beyond that, foreign
policy's relative obscurity to much of the American public may make such
partisan-promoting agreements more likely. 2 23 We might also worry that
members of Congress lack proper incentives to disagree with the President
even when members of their constituencies might wish they would.
Particularly with regard to foreign affairs and national security, success may
be very hard to demonstrate. Failure though may be much clearer.
Particularly for representatives elected every two years, there may be little
electoral value in owning foreign policy positions.224 Better to leave those to
the President (who may be unable to avoid them) and focus on the sort of
bread-and-butter issues likely to be more salient to their much smaller, more
localized constituencies. And the President's first-mover advantage in

221. See David H. Moore, Taking Cues from Congress: JudicialReview, Congressional
Authorization, and the Expansion of PresidentialPower, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1027-

40 (2010).
222. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119

H-ARV. L. REV. 2311, 2315-16, 2323, 2326-27, 2329-30, 2336-42, 2351-52 (2006); Moore,
supra note 221, at 1029.
223. See Moore, supra note 221, at 1038-39; see also Jide Nzelibe, Our PartisanForeign

Affairs Constitution, 97 MINN. L. REV. 838, 905 (2013).
224. See Moore, supra note 221, at 1031-33.
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foreign and national security affairs may make it hard politically for Congress
to serve as a check. It may be very difficult, for example, for Congress to use
its powers over the purse to defund an armed conflict already in progress.22 5
All of these concerns suggest that where the two branches are in
agreement, the arguments for a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine
disappear. Judicial intervention becomes necessary to guarantee that the
political branches have not improperly shut voices out.
It is in this sense that Jesse Choper's argument is only half-right. Congress
and the President have the tools to check each other, but we have good reason
to believe that they are often unwilling or unable to use them. When that's
the case, the courts should intervene to at least make sure that the gears of
democracy haven't broken or gotten stuck. The same would be true if using
their respective tools, Congress or the President is unable to protect individual
rights. But when Congress and the President are fending for themselves, are
checking each other, the politics-reinforcing political question doctrine
suggests courts should allow them to do so.
Finally, from theories of judicial restraint and pluralism, a politicsreinforcing political question doctrine draws a commitment to minimalism in
separation of powers cases. In some cases, particularly where important
individual rights are at issue, courts may need to decide disputes between the
branches. Standing in opposition to all of the arguments here for forbearance
are Marbury's other famous admonitions, "that where there is a legal right,
there is also a legal remedy," 22 6 and that "[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 227 The courts have
long had an implicit exception to the political question doctrine for claims
225. See, e.g., Steve Huntley, "Toothless" Congress Resolution Might End Up Having Real
Bite, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 16, 2007, at 41 (describing Congressional attempt to voice displeasure
with the war in Iraq); Michael Abramowitz, Bush, Congress Could Face Confrontation on Issue
of War Powers, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/15/AR2007021501703.html ("Democrats have described these
conditions as part of a slow strategy to stop the war without cutting funding completely, which
most parties agree would be legally permissible but politically difficult."); Anne Flaherty,
House Members Joust over Iraq War Policy, EXPRESS GROUP (Feb. 13, 2007),
http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/house-members-joust-over-iraq-war-policy-/23284/
(describing Congressional attempt to voice displeasure with the war in Iraq); James M. Lindsay,
Is Operation Odyssey Dawn Constitutional?Part V, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Apr. 5, 2011),

http://blogs.cfr.org/lindsay/201 1/04/05/is-operation-odyssey-dawn-constitutional-part-v/
("Congress can stop the president only by passing a law that commands him to do so. But that
law is subject to a presidential veto.").
226. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23).

227. Id. at 177.
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regarding important individual rights,228 an exception a politics-reinforcing
political question doctrine should share and make explicit. But when a court
must decide such a case, a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine
counsels that the court decide the separation-of-powers question in as
minimalist a manner as possible, only delineating the lines between Congress
and the President as much as necessary to decide the individual rights claim.
Courts should be highly cognizant not to inadvertently eliminate the space
that overlapping congressional and presidential claims of authority create for
future substantive policy debates.
As Part IV will explain, the strands of constitutional thought that come
together in a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine help define its
application to specific cases. As that Part will unpack through the examples
of Youngstown, Zivotofsky, and Boumediene, a court faced with a separationof-powers question invokes the politics-reinforcing political question
doctrine only when the two branches are opposed and only where both
political branches can make prima facie claims to have constitutional
authority over the issue. Once those circumstances are established, a court
must weigh the importance of any individual right claimed against the value
of leaving separation-of-powers questions open. If the claimed right is
important enough to require the court to exercise jurisdiction, the court should
adopt as minimalist a decision as possible to vindicate the right, leaving
maximal room for future political branch contestation.
C.

Rescuing a Politics-ReinforcingPoliticalQuestion Doctrinefrom
the Shadows of Baker and Youngstown

Given the importance that encouraging, or at least not quashing,
democratic deliberation plays within other areas of constitutional law, why
haven't these concerns so far come to the fore in judicial and scholarly
discussions of the political question doctrine? There are a few possible
explanations for the blindspot. First, Baker and its six factors have served as
the starting point for discussions of the political question doctrine and have
dominated debates over its scope and application. But those factors provide
little space for concerns about political pluralism and robust political debate.
On the contrary, the Baker factors are in many ways about when to use the
political question doctrine to mute or quash political debate. Concerns about
228. See Nzelibe, supra note 99, at 1006 (writing of foreign relations and national security
cases in which the courts have intervened to protect individual rights that "[a]ll these cases may
be understood to hold that the courts have an obligation to adjudicate on foreign affairs issues that
involve individual rights claims").
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second-guessing policy decisions, about embarrassing the United States,
about undermining the finality of government decisions, about speaking with
one voice as a nation reflected in Baker's factors are arguments to cut off
debate, to avoid reopening questions. As a result, arguments for or against a
broad political question doctrine have assumed that a broad political question
doctrine would close off debate while a narrow one would open it up.
Advocates for more deliberation have thus generally opposed the political
question doctrine. Zivotofsky I though demonstrates that these assumptions
were mistaken. A narrow political question doctrine, when coupled with
broad understandings of one or the other branch's powers, can actually
silence debate, by cutting one branch out of the discussion and, with that
branch, those voices and interests who are better represented there.
Second, debates over the political question doctrine have rarely focused
on cases in which Congress and the President are actually opposed. As the
Court in Zivotofsky II made clear, such cases are relatively rare.229 In fact,
there seems to be an underlying assumption in both the decisions and
literature that the political question doctrine would be least applicable in such
cases, that on the contrary, where the two branches are in conflict, the courts
have a duty to answer the question. 23 0 This assumption is clearly influenced
by the focus on Baker's factors. Where the two branches are in disagreement,
it is harder to show that the decision has been committed to one branch or the
other, and the risk that judicial scrutiny would lead to embarrassment,
undermine finality, or risk the United States speaking with one voice all seem
slight. The other two branches are already accomplishing those. But this
assumption also reveals the shadow of Youngstown and Justice Jackson's
famous tripartite analysis of separation of powers questions. According to
Justice Jackson's framework, "[w]hen the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at
its lowest ebb." 23 ' Under such circumstances, "Presidential claim to a
power . . must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the
equilibrium established by our constitutional system." 23 2 Many seemed to
have read this powerful precedent as an implicit gloss on the political
question doctrine, suggesting not only a method for analyzing presidentialcongressional conflicts, but as a call for courts to exert jurisdiction over that
category of disputes. The extraordinary power of that parallel precedent,
229. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2113 (2015)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
230. See, e.g., Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340 (D.D.C. 1987).
231. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
232. Id. at 638.

46

ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

though, seems to have obscured the potential costs to the democratic process
of deciding those disputes. The next Part will consider the relationship
between a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine and Youngstown in
greater depth.
Third, the potential for the political question doctrine to protect and
promote political debate has been obscured by questions about whether the
existing doctrine is a constitutional requirement, disabling the courts from
answering certain questions or a prudential doctrine used by courts to manage
relations with the other branches. As concerns have risen that the courts have
used the political question doctrine to abdicate their duty and avoid deciding
hard cases, critics have emphasized the narrower, more constitutional aspects
of the doctrine, specifically the first two Baker factors, and sought to limit
the effect of the more prudential ones reflected in the final four. This is clearly
part of the majority's project in Zivotofsky I, in which the first two factors are
discussed and the others disappear, a move that pushed Justice Sotomayor to
write a concurrence defending the more prudential aspects of the doctrine.23 3
This perceived tension between encouraging debate and prudential
considerations has driven a wedge between the political question doctrine and
other democracy-reinforcing doctrines or techniques like the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance, ripeness and mootness, and judicial minimalism, all
of which encourage the courts to engage in prudential decision-making. A
politics-reinforcing political question doctrine is a prudential doctrine, but
one designed to encourage rather than silence political debate.234
Finally, the modern political question doctrine focuses on the courts'
institutional weakness-a broad political question doctrine assumes the
courts lack the information, expertise, legitimacy, or authority to make
certain constitutional decisions. Those who disagree push back. But a
politics-reinforcing political question doctrine is different. It assumes strong,
knowledgeable courts, which can decide how best to promote debate over
233. Zivotofskyexrel. Zivotofskyv. Clinton (Zivotofsky l), 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1433-43 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
234. Decisions regarding the political question since Baker have evinced considerable
confusion whether the doctrine presented constitutional limitations on judicial action, prudential
consideration a court could or should consider, some combination of the two, or the former
informed by the latter. A politics-reinforcing political question doctrine would be a prudential
doctrine, but one with constitutional underpinning in separation of powers. See Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,423 (1964) (explaining that although the Act of State doctrine
is not constitutionally required it does have .'constitutional' underpinnings" and "arises out of
the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers").
Unlike previous incarnations of the political question doctrine, it is concerned less about
maintaining separation of powers between the courts and political branches and more about
maintaining separation of powers between the political branches themselves.
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issues and protect voices that may need certain avenues to be heard. It
assumes courts are able to weigh when the political branches are providing
those avenues, and that they should stay back when they are not, and the
courts need to provide the room needed for dissent.

IV.

A POLITICS-REINFORCING POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE IN
ACTION

So how would a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine actually
work? The political question doctrine described here is designed to be
politics-reinforcing. It counsels judicial forbearance when deciding too much
in one case might limit the opportunities for debates on different subjects in
the future. The contested, overlapping boundaries of congressional and
presidential power create opportunities for substantive policy debates. A
politics-reinforcing political question doctrine suggests treading lightly over
that territory, exercising restraint when the political branches are in
disagreement and where resolving their substantive policy disputes might
resolve their broader constitutional suits as well.
But a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine is not meant to
immunize government actions from scrutiny, nor to sanction judicial
abdication. Pushing up against any doctrine of judicial restraint is Marbury's
admonition "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." 235 This has long been interpreted to
require U.S. courts to decide cases when they have jurisdiction, and it is
important, as described in the prior Part, not to allow courts to simply duck
cases they do not like, are afraid to get wrong, or that they feel will get them
into trouble. This requirement to decide justiciable cases, though, has most
often been honored in the breach. A range of doctrines softens its hard edges,
allowing or encouraging courts to avoid deciding certain questions through
the canon of constitutional avoidance, the act of state doctrine, the state secret
privilege, forum non-conveniens, and comity, among others. The Supreme
Court, of course, uses its discretion over whether to grant writs of certiorari
to tailor its own docket. Moreover, the category of "justiciable" cases is
hardly self-defining. Standing, mootness, and ripeness have all been
understood more expansively or more restrictively over time. Decisions on
the scope of those justiciability doctrines necessarily take normative concerns
over whether to decide a case into account. What all of this means is that
normative questions concerning whether courts should hear or decide certain
disputes are unavoidable. The best we can do is to keep the opposing concerns
235. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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constantly in mind, including the importance of guaranteeing that "where
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy."23 6 It is for that reason that
a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine must take the vindication of
individual rights seriously in analyzing when and how courts should
intervene in disputes between the branches.
All of this requires careful balancing that the politics-reinforcing political
question incorporates through a two-step inquiry. Step one requires a
determination whether, in any given case, the politics-reinforcing political
question doctrine is applicable at all. This step involves two inquiries: first,
whether the two political branches are in opposition23 7 and thus themselves
giving voice to different views among the public, and second, whether each
branch can make a reasonable prima facie case that it has independent
authority to set policy on that issue. If either of those threshold tests is not
met, the politics-reinforcing political question doctrine is inapplicable. If the
politics-reinforcing political question doctrine is applicable, step two requires
a determination whether judicial intervention is nonetheless necessary to
respond to a potential violation of an important right. This step requires
weighing the importance of the claim raised in a case against the importance
of keeping the channels of political debate open. As explained below, it is
separate inquiry from standing; it comes up only if the requirements for
standing are already met. If a court decides in step two that it must decide a
plaintiffs claim, the politics-reinforcing political question doctrine focus
shifts from abstention to minimalism, counseling a court to decide the rights
claim as narrowly as possible with regard to separation-of-powers (it might
be broad with regard to the right, for example), so as to protect the space for
future debates.238 As will be explained below, sometimes deciding a claim
will not allow for a narrow separation-of-powers holding.

236. Id.

at

163 (internal quotations omitted)

(quoting 3 WILLIAM

BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES *23).

237. Of course, as debates over the Youngstown categories have demonstrated, deciding
whether the President and Congress are aligned or in opposition can be more art than science. Not
everyone would agree with how Justice Stevens or Chief Justice Roberts categorized the situations
in Hamdan or Medellin, for example. What the politics-reinforcing political question doctrine sets
up is an ideal type that acts as principle for its application. The real question is whether the
political channels of debate are continuing to actively provide voice to disagreements within the

public.
238. The step-two analysis resembles the approach Jide Nzelibe develops as part of his
balance of institutional competencies model of the political question doctrine, in which courts
balance foreign policy concerns against individual rights claims, and shift from abstention to
political branch deference when important individual rights are at stake. See Nzelibe, supra note

99, at 1005-06.
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Each of these inquiries requires judgment and one might ask whether the
courts are best situated to make these decisions well. But unlike some of the
substantive questions the courts might be asked to answer in the absence of a
politics-reinforcing political question doctrine-for example, whether a
notation in a passport will be seen by foreign powers as an act of
recognition-questions on which the courts might arguably have less
expertise than the political branches, these inquiries focus courts on question
well-within their usual wheelhouse-questions of fair and robust process,
individual rights, and the outer-boundaries of constitutional powers. 23 9 Rather
than interposing themselves between the political branches on policy
questions, the courts are asked to guarantee a fair state of play between them,
the openness of those branches' debates to different voices within the
political community, and protection of individuals or minorities against
majoritarian decision-making. These types of questions are not easy for
courts, but courts are certainly better situated to answer them than political
branches who may not be interested in enhancing the voices of others at the
potential expense of their own or those of their favored constituents.
The politics-reinforcing political question doctrine's two-step inquiry and
its components can be better understood with reference to real cases. As such,
the rest of this section uses three iconic cases, Youngstown, Zivotofsky, and
Boumediene to show how a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine
would or would not have changed their outcomes. Key though to
understanding this inquiry is that it is less a strict test designed to produce
specific outcome in particular cases than a framework for raising and
balancing key principles that should apply to separation of powers cases.
More than driving particular outcomes, the goal is to guarantee the
consideration of key values. And these politics-reinforcing justiciability
principles should have value, reifying our commitments to robust political
debate, separation of powers, and individual rights, even if not embedded in
a per se pluralistic political question doctrine.

239. See, e.g., id. (suggesting courts have comparative institutional advantages in dealing
with individual rights claims); D. Theodore Rave, Politiciansas Fiduciaries,126 HARV. L. REV.
671, 679 (2013) (describing "focus not on the substantive political outcomes, but on ensuring that
the processes are free from incumbent interference" as "a role for which courts are institutionally
well suited"); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 95
(2004) (suggesting that courts' comparative institutional advantages "favor process-oriented
doctrines over substantive ones").
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A. Youngstown
As mentioned above, a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine may
initially seem to conflict with the framework established in Justice Jackson's
Youngstown concurrence. Jackson describes three categories of separationof-powers cases-one in which Congress and the President are aligned, a
second in which the President acts in the face of congressional silence, and a
third in which they are opposition. 24 0 It is the third category of cases, suggests
Justice Jackson, which "must be scrutinized with caution." 24 1This captures a
general intuition, apparent in some commentary on the political question
doctrine, that we are less worried about those cases in which the President is
acting with Congress than those in which he is acting in opposition to it. It is
the latter set of cases that raise the specter of lawlessness or even tyranny.
But this intuition seems to point in the opposite direction from the politicsreinforcing political question doctrine, which counsels restraint when the
branches are opposed and intervention when they are aligned. A politicsreinforcing political question doctrine must be able to relieve this tension.
In Youngstown, the Court was faced with President Truman's decision, in
the face of threatened steelworker strikes, to seize the nation's steel plants to
guarantee continued steel production during the Korean War.242 In the
absence of congressional authorization-in fact, Congress seemed to
specifically reject such a power in the legislation it adopted24 3 -the President
relied heavily on his inherent powers as Executive and Commander-inChief.2 44 The majority rejected those arguments and found against the
President.24 5
In his influential concurrence, Justice Jackson suggested that "[w]hen the
President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb." 246 "Courts can sustain exclusive
Presidential control in such a case" only where the President's powers are
"conclusive and preclusive," essentially "disabling the Congress from acting
upon the subject." 247 This has generally been understood as a directive for
courts to more heavily scrutinize cases where Congress and the President
have taken opposing actions. It also seems to set up a binary choice: if
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952).
Id. at 638.
Id. at 582-83.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 637.
Id. at 637-38.
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Congress has exclusive authority or Congress and the President have
concurrent authority, the President must bow to Congressional will; if the
President's powers though are exclusive, no Congressional act may stand in
her way. In fact, Jackson's concurrence seems to draw an even stronger
contrast, suggesting that where the President's powers are exclusive,
Congress is "disabled" from acting, whether or not the President has acted
contrary to Congress' act. Zivotofsky II seems to suggest as much in its focus
on the President's exclusive power over recognition.248
Two things are worth noting here. First, Justice Jackson's tripartite
framework provides a rubric for assessing the constitutionality of
congressional and Presidential acts. It does not suggest that that rubric will
be or must always be applied by courts. A politics-reinforcing political
question doctrine would leave many separation-of-powers disputes to the
public to resolve through politics; Justice Jackson's framework provides a
useful rule of thumb for the public to use in assessing the two branches'
conflicting claims either before or in the absence ofjudicial resolution. It also
helps frame questions of legality for lawyers within those branches, who need
to consider the constitutionality of actions those branches might take. More
broadly though, not all conflicts between the branches will be justiciable.
Oftentimes, no one will have standing to bring a claim. Mootness and
ripeness may also stand in the way of court involvement. 24 9 A politicsreinforcing political question doctrine simply supplies one more argument for
non-justiciability or abstention.
Second, there has been some slippage in the case-law in the use of the
terms concurrent, independent, exclusive, preclusive, and conclusive.
Generally speaking, the President and Congress' powers are exclusive. The
President has the exclusive power to receive ambassadors or to negotiate
treaties. Congress has the exclusive power to make laws regarding foreign
commerce, and the Senate has exclusive power to approve treaties and
appointments of ambassadors. The President has exclusive power as
Commander-in-Chief; Congress has the exclusive power to declare war and
248. Zivotofsky II could be read more narrowly to only disable congressional acts that force
the President to "contradict" himself on questions of recognition. While that limiting reading may
very well have been the intent of the majority, that limiting reading seems in function mere
semantics. A President could always argue that the Government's position is to take no position
at all or to remain ambiguous on recognition. Essentially, Congress's acts are only effective when
the President chooses to treat them as such.
249. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 813-14 (1997) (refusing to adjudicate a challenge of
the Line Item Veto Act by members of Congress for lack of Article III standing); Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996-98 (1979) (refusing to decide a dispute between Congress and the
Executive on whether the President could terminate a treaty with Taiwan).

ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL

52

[Ariz. St. L.J.

to make rules and regulations for the military. These exclusive powers though
may result in concurrent authority over a particular question; both branches
may have some claim to use their exclusive powers, for example, to dictate
the contents of U.S. citizen passports or to make decisions about permissible
military tactics.

2 50

The question raised by Youngstown category three is what

to do when the two branches, exercising their supposedly exclusive powers
generate conflicting demands. As the conflicts-of-law language suggests, this
situation requires a conflicts rule. The question is whether either branch's
authority over an issue is preclusive and/or conclusive, disabling the other
branch from exercising its powers in the area.
A politics-reinforcing political question doctrine would not suggest a
different conflicts rule. It would simply suggest exercising caution before
applying it. Where a plaintiff has standing (see the first point above) and the
case cannot be resolved without resolving the conflict between the powers of
the branches (in other words, no more minimalist path to decision can be
found), the courts would need to apply it.
But before getting to that conflicts rule, the courts must first decide a
threshold question: does each branch have "independent" power with regard
to that question as all? (Admittedly, these two questions are elided in Justice
Jackson's opinion.) Essentially, this is step one of the politics-reinforcing
political question doctrine inquiry. If one branch's power is dependent on the
acts of the other, it is not "exclusive," and if a branch has no power to act in
the absence of authorization from the other, there's no conflict to resolve. The
question instead becomes one about the scope of the branch's exclusive
powers. If the commander-in-chief power does not grant the President
authority to seize steel mills in the United States when no war is taking place
there, the courts should have no problem deciding the case against the
President. So too, if the Commander-in-Chief does not include the power to
set up military commissions outside of wartime. 25 1 A politics-reinforcing
political question doctrine would not suggest otherwise. It would only
counsel caution when the branches have concurrent, exclusive authority over
an issue. In other words, Youngstown would likely turn out the same way, a
250. Cf Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2126 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("For this reason, they did not entrust either the President or Congress with sole
power to adopt uncontradictable policies about any subject-foreign-sovereignty disputes
included. They instead gave each political department its own powers, and with that the freedom
to contradict the other's policies.").
251. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597-613 (2006) (plurality opinion) (observing
that "[n]one of the overt acts alleged to have been committed in furtherance of the agreement is
itself a war crime, or even necessarily occurred during time of, or in a theater of, war").
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defeat for the President, even with a politics-reinforcing political question
doctrine.252
To put it a different way, applying a politics-reinforcing political question
doctrine to a particular case would require a court to first do a prima facie
analysis of whether each branch seemed to have exclusive or independent
powers that authorized it to act in the way it sought to. In the case of President
Truman's seizure of the steel mills to avert a strike during the Korean War,
the issue raised in Youngstown, the question would be whether any of the
President's constitutional powers gave him the authority to do so on his own,
without congressional authorization. If the answer is clearly no, the courts
should simply decide the case that way. The same would apply to Congress.25 3
If, as some suggested, Congress simply lacked any independent constitutional
authority to dictate what country is listed as a place of birth in a passport, the
courts should simply have decided Zivotofsky II against it.2 54 With regard to
either branch, the answer may depend on the court's theory of their respective
powers-in other words, different courts may come to different
conclusions.255 If though, there is an at least arguable case that the two
branches each have independent, exclusive power to act on the issue, the
politics-reinforcing political question doctrine would kick in. Youngstown
though helps demonstrate how many of the most worrisome acts of overreach
by one of the political branches will be effectively blocked in step one, before
a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine is even applied.
None of this is meant to suggest that doing such a prima facie inquiry
would be simple or that there is a clear line between "off-the-wall" and
plausible, arguable, or colorable claims of independent constitutional
authority. 256 Even if we were to suggest a strict test of what might be on one
252. Cf Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of

Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1782-85 (2012) (suggesting that Youngstown should have been an
easy case against the President because any "prerogative" powers he might have would not allow
the President to take property in the absence of legal authorization). Chapman and McConnell
also suggest that Youngstown would survive the politics-reinforcing political question doctrine
under step two as a clear case of an individual rights violation a deprivation of property without
due process of law. Id.
253. Of course, given the breadth of Congress's powers under current doctrine, including
powers granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause, cases involving attempted congressional acts
that are obviously beyond their powers may be rare.
254. See infra note 239.
255. Of course, deciding whether something is within a branch's exclusive powers may be
complicated more art than science. A politics-reinforcing political question doctrine would have
no force if the courts were always forced to first definitively decide what was inside or outside
the scope of the branch's authority. The doctrine might collapse in upon itself.
256. See Pozen, supra note 5, at 916.
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side of the line, courts would likely differ in their judgment and differ over
time.2 57 Constitutional plausibility has a way of shifting with ideology,
political realities, and cultural norms. 258 This inquiry though is not meant to
produce specific outcomes. Instead, it is designed to highlight the questions
the court should ask in its attempt to balance the constitutional interests laid
out here, including both rule-of-law and room for political debate. The more
implausible a branch's claim of independent constitutional power seems, the
more a court should consider simply deciding against it; the more plausible it
seems, the more a court should consider abstention or at least minimalism.
B.

Zivotofsky

'

As described above, Zivotofsky I and II involved the President's decision
to continue listing "Jerusalem" as the place of birth on all passports of
American citizens born despite a statute requiring "Israel" to be recorded
instead when the citizen (or his or her guardian) so requested.259 In Zivotojksy
I, a majority of the Court held that the case did not present a political
question.2 60 In Zivotofsky II, a majority of the Court held in favor of the
President, finding that the statute unconstitutionally impinged upon the
President's exclusive power over the recognition of states and
governments.26
As in Youngtown, there is little doubt that Zivotofsky passes one of the two
step-one thresholds for applying the politics-reinforcing political question
doctrine. The President and Congress are clearly opposed. Even more so, they
were using their disagreement over their respective powers as a way to debate
a substantive policy question of interest to the American public-the United
States' position on the status of Jerusalem. The other part of step-one analysis
might be less clear. Justice Thomas argued that requiring the notation of a
particular place of birth in a passport was completely beyond Congress's
enumerated powers.26 2 Justice Scalia, in dissent, argued that the notation of
Jerusalem or Israel did not invoke the President's power to receive
ambassadors.2 63 Perhaps either or both would think that those answers are
257. We could always try to devise strict standards of plausibility. It seems unlikely though
that they would matter or change the results.
258. See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 119 (2011); Pozen, supra note 5,
at 916.
259. See supra Part II.B.

260.
261.
262.
263.

Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky 1), 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424 (2012).
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2081 (2015).
Id. at 2097 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 2119 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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obvious enough to avoid the politics-reinforcing political question doctrine
entirely. The question in the case was not posed to them that way though.
Having decided in Zivotofsky Ithat the case was justiciable, both justices had
to decide the case for one or the other branch. Had they been asked whether
Congress and the President could make out at least prima facie cases that they
had authority over passport notations, the two Justices might have thought
they did. Even if they would not, most other observers likely would have. The
uncertain boundaries between the President's and Congress's powers over
recognition and passports are what made the case so difficult.
Assuming then that the step-one inquiries would suggest a case ripe for
the politics-reinforcing political question doctrine, the inquiry turns to step
two, which weighs the importance of the plaintiffs claim. Protecting the
functions of the political process is an important interest, but so too is
vindicating important individual rights.264 In the case of Zivotofsky, the lower
courts considered whether Menachem Zivotofsky had a sufficient interest in
the passport notation he requested to give him standing to challenge the
Executive Branch's policy. 26 5 Zivotofsky's injury might have seemed
frivolous or hypothetical, but the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal determined
that the denial of an individualized, statutory right-here, the right to choose
"Israel" over "Jerusalem"-was an injury-in-fact sufficient to give him
standing to sue.266 But regardless of whether Zivotofsky had standing, his
injury might still be too small to offset concerns about resolving separationof-powers questions unnecessarily. A court could reasonably find that
Zivotofsky might have standing, but that the politics-reinforcing political
question doctrine would still counsel abstention.
It is important to keep this step-one analysis distinct from standing. There
have been some who have argued that individuals should not have standing
to bring what are really separation-of-powers claims. 2 67 But bringing all of
the concerns that might make a case a political question into the standing
analysis warps that analysis, which should, fundamentally, be about the
plaintiff and not about the structure or health of American democracy.
Moreover, standing is too blunt a tool to accomplish the goals of the politicsreinforcing political question doctrine. Either plaintiffs have standing to raise
264. See Nzelibe, supra note 99, at 1005 (advocating for a balancing model where "the courts
would not abstain from any controversy that presents a 'bona fide' individual rights claim even if
it purports to challenge the 'wisdom' of a foreign policy determination").
265. Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. v. Sec'y of State, 444 F.3d 614, 615, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
266. Id. at 617.
267. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Standingfor the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REv. 1435,
1475-80 (2013). But see Kent Barnett, Standingfor (andup to) Separation of Powers, 91 IND.
L.J. 665, 670 (2016) (arguing that Huq is wrong).
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separation of powers claims, or plaintiffs do not. Standing doctrine does not
distinguish between cases where the political branches are in agreement or
disagreement, a distinction this Article suggests is of central importance.
Because standing turns on the plaintiff and the plaintiffs claim rather than
on the nature of the political act, there is no principled way to use standing
doctrine to protect open channels of democratic debate while scrutinizing
potential cases of democratic failure or political branch collusion. If anything,
standing may be easier to find in cases involving congressional-Presidential
disagreement since plaintiffs will be able to show injury where, as in
Zivotofsky, Congress has granted a right and the President has denied it.
If a court though thought Menachem Zivotofsky's claim important enough
to require judicial intervention, the politics-reinforcing political question
doctrine would still play a role, suggesting to that court that it decide
Zivotofsky's claim in the manner that resolves as few separation-of-powers
question as possible. Justice Scalia's dissent in Zivotofsky Ilmight reflect that
sort of minimalism. Justice Scalia focused on the specific requirement
enacted by Congress. For him, requiring the notation of Israel in a passport is
not, in-and-of-itself, an act of recognition. It is too insignificant an act, with
too uncertain of a meaning, to act as U.S. policy on the status of Jerusalem.
On this basis, Justice Scalia would have held for the Zivotofskys on narrow
grounds-narrow grounds that would say little about the actual boundaries
between presidential and congressional authority over recognition of states
or governments in future cases.26 8 Justice Scalia emphasizes the questions he
is not deciding: "the Constitution may well deny Congress power to
recognize,"269 and "[e]ven if the Constitution gives the President sole
power, "270 he hedges.
Endorsing such minimalism raises two objections: one, that minimalism
could, over-time, incrementally have the same effect as the maximalism this
268. Another example of this sort of minimalism might be detected in the Court's decision
in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556-57 (2014), another case in which the plaintiffs
case necessitated a decision on the boundaries of the political branches' respective authority. For
some, the Court's split-the-baby approach, in which it decided that the President could make
recess appointments between sessions of Congress, but that only "significant interruptions of
legislative business" longer than ten days would count, seemed pulled from thin-air. But it could
be read as an implicit recognition of the principles described in this Article and an attempt to
retain as much space for political branch jockeying as possible. Cf Jamal Greene, The Supreme
Court as a ConstitutionalCourt, 128 HARV. L. REV. 124, 127 (2014) (describing the value of the
holding's specificity). The back-and-forth over appointments is, of course, one of the ways that
uncertain, overlapping powers of the political branches give voice to different parts of the
electorate.
269. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2121 (2015)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 2120.
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doctrine is trying to avoid, and the other, that minimalist views may not be
neutral, but may systematically favor one branch over the other. With regard
to the first, it is possible that small moves to define the boundaries of the
political branches' respective powers could over time add up, eventually
leading to the overly constricted, overly siloed understanding of their powers
that a politics-reinforcing political question doctrine is designed to avoid. The
cases that require these kinds of decisions though should be quite rare, and
the accretion of decisions necessary to have that effect might be measured in
the centuries rather than decades. The second objection is based on a
hypothesis that may or may not be correct. But even if it is, it highlights the
fact that the politics-reinforcing political question doctrine should dictate the
scope of outcomes, not the outcomes themselves. On occasion, it may not be
possible to hold for either Congress or the President in a minimalist way. This
might have been true in Zivotofsky II. The majority tried to limit its opinion
to cases in which Congress is asking the President to contradict himself on a
question of recognition2 7 1 and disavowed the broad executive dicta of CurtissWright.2 72 In the end though, to get to a conclusion that the President must
control even small acts regarding recognition, the majority may have had no
choice but to recognize a broad, disabling power in the President. 273 A
narrower route to finding for the President may not have been possible. For
judges believing that the President should have that authority over passports,
a more maximalist opinion might have been the only option, and the politicsreinforcing political question cannot stand in its way.
One last note on Zivotofsky: Zivotofsky demonstrates well why abstaining
under the politics-reinforcing political question doctrine need not be a blank
check for the President. Critics would rightly observe that if the courts refrain
from intervening in disputes between the President and Congress, the
President may, in many cases, simply be able to do as he wishes. 2 74 But
Zivotofsky highlights the political salience of these disputes. If the courts had
refused to intervene in Zivotofsky's case, the Zivotofskys would still have
been able to make arguments to the public about the President's refusal to
271. Id. at 2080 ("If Congress may not pass a law, speaking in its own voice, effecting formal
recognition, then it may not force the President . . . to contradict his prior recognition
determination.").
272. Id. at 2079 (explaining that the Court's precedent recognizes recognition as an exclusive
executive power, but that Curtiss-Wright"does not support a broader definition of the Executive's
power over foreign relations that would permit the President alone to determine the whole content
of the Nation's foreign policy").
273. See Cohen, supra note 178, at 12.
274. See Galbraith,supranote, 27, at 17 ("Treatment of the case as a political question would
not do a lot to preserve uncertainty, since that outcome would effectively have handed a longterm institutional victory to the executive branch by removing the threat of judicial review.").
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abide by Congress, and Congress's active opposition to the President
suggests that those arguments may have been politically salient. Congress too
could have pushed back, holding hearings, enacting other similar laws, even
threatening impeachment. None of those may have changed the President's
stance entirely, but they certainly would have served their role in articulating
a different view within the public on the status of Jerusalem, one that the
President might want to take into account. It might not get a notation of
"Israel" in Menachem Zivotofsky's passport. But of course, after the courts'
intervention in Zivotofsky II, that certainly won't happen, and now, the room
for those political debates is partially closed off.
C.

Boumediene

Boumediene v. Bush demonstrates the ways in which the two-step inquiry
guarantees that the courts will intervene to decide hard, political salient cases
when necessary. It helps explain why Boumediene v. Bush was not, and
should not have been treated as a political question. As such, it also helps
explain why the politics-reinforcing political question doctrine should not be
subject to the same criticisms that have long dogged the modem post-Baker
version of the doctrine.
Boumediene involved a challenge by non-citizen detainees to their
detention at Guantanamo Bay and the constitutionality of the Military
Commissions Act, which limited any review of their detention to the
procedures established in the Detainee Treatment Act.275 Baker's factors
might have suggested that such a case could be a political question. For one
thing, the case raised the question of whether the constitutional right to
habeas corpus applied to Guantanamo Bay at all, a question that might turn
in part on whether Guantanamo Bay was under the sovereignty of the United
States. 276 The position of the United States had long been that the United
States was merely leasing Guantanamo Bay and that Cuba retained
sovereignty.2 77 In the past, questions of sovereignty had been treated as
political questions left to the political branches, something Justice Kennedy
275. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 amended the federal habeas statute to strip from
federal courts any and all "jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas
corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined
by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination." Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006),
invalidatedby Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008).
276. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008).
277. Id. at 727.
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discussed in his majority opinion.2 78 Undiscussed in the case though were the
fact that the case involved questions of national security that courts had often
found to be committed to the political branches under the first Baker factor,
that the case involved difficult questions about how much process to give
detainees in an ongoing conflict that might confound manageable judicial
standards under the second factor, and that resolving the case threatened
judicial policymaking, embarrassment for the political branches, finality, and
the United States' ability to speak with one voice in foreign affairs under
factors three through six. The fact that none of these were even raised in the
case reflects the implicit understanding that certain, important individual
rights claims presented an exception to the political question.27 9
A politics-reinforcing political question doctrine does a far better job than
Baker at explaining why the case did not present political questions that the
courts should abstain from answering. First, the threshold set in step one of
the politics-reinforcing political question doctrine analysis could not be
overcome. The two branches were not in disagreement, nor did the case turn
on the scope of their respective, as opposed to joint powers. Moreover,
abstaining would not have reinforced the space for political debate. On the
contrary, the political debate had run its course. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, four
of the justices had invited Congress to express its views more clearly. 280 The
Military Commissions Act was Congress's response. And given the climate
of the war on terror, the unpopularity of the detainees at Guantanamo, and
concerns that Congress might defer too much to the Executive in wartime,
the courts would have had more than sufficient reason to worry that political
process was not functioning properly or was silencing rather than
empowering particular voices. Intervention to inquire about those processes
would have seemed the prudent, democracy-reinforcing path.
Even if step one had suggested applying the politics-reinforcing political
question doctrine, step two would have weighed in favor of deciding the case.
The right to challenge one's detention is among the most fundamental of
rights, and the politics-reinforcing political question doctrine would not have
blocked consideration of the detainees' claims. And the case arguably
warranted Justice Kennedy's more maximalist opinion that the constitution
278. Id. at 753; see also Anthony J. Colangelo, "De Facto Sovereignty": Boumediene and
Beyond, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623, 674 (2009).
279. See Nzelibe, supra note 99, at 1000; see also Chapman & McConnell, supra note 252,
at 1783-85 (reframing Youngstown as an individual rights case concerning deprivation of
property without due process of law).
280. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Where, as
here, no emergency prevents consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon that
consultation does not weaken our Nation's ability to deal with danger.").
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extends the writ of habeas corpus to a place, like Guantanamo Bay, where the
United States exercises de facto control. A more minimalist opinion might
have read the processes of the Detainee Treatment Act expansively so that it
could provide an adequate substitute for habeas review and eliminate the need
to decide the broader question whether habeas corpus extended to
Guantanamo Bay. But such a minimalist opinion would have done nothing to
preserve space for democratic deliberation. On the contrary, the argument
that Guantanamo Bay was beyond the Constitution's reach had been used to
shut down debate.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since Baker, the political question doctrine has become a shield behind
which the political branches hide from scrutiny. Rather than protecting the
political process, the doctrine now protects political outcomes-a trump card
that ends debate. And critics have been right to criticize it as such. Zivotofsky
I and Zivotofsky II though show that simply eliminating the doctrine will not
solve the problem. Removing the political question doctrine will not
guarantee scrutiny of governmental decisions. In fact, if the courts decide on
the merits in favor of broad political branch powers, scrutiny may become
even more difficult. What is needed instead is a doctrine specifically designed
around encouraging and promoting debate and scrutiny. The politicsreinforcing political question doctrine can serve that role.

